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ABSTRACT

A number of basic themes suggest themselves as focal
points for a study of the thought of Jonathan Edwards. The
dissertation is an attempt to argue that experience is one
of them, and that an attentive eye to the doctrine of experience will reveal it as the unifying theme of his philosophy. Specifically, at the center of Edwards' aesthetic
and religious vision there lies a rich and profound sense
of experience, and of the relation of all things to some
form of perception.
The evidence is to be found in Edwards' extensive
published and unpublished writings. Among the several
editions of his collected works, the 1808 Worcester edition
and the 1829 Dwight edition are the most complete and most
reliable. Another especially valuable source is the
"Miscellaneous Observations," a notebook of random thoughts
Edwards kept throughout his life. Parts of this journal
are published, but a great deal remains unpublished in the
Yale University Library, and contains a wealth of insights
into the mind of Edwards,
It is important to note the doctrinal influences of
covenant theology. There had always been a disposition among
the Puritans to emphasize real assent in religious matters.
Their gradual acceptance of experience as a guide to
doctrine can be attributed to the influence of medieval NeoPlatonism as well as to their own historical situation.

Three elements form the center of Edwards' doctrine
of experience. They are the idea of beauty, the sense of
the heart, and the theological concept of grace. An ex-b
planation of each of these components in themselves and
in their interrelations reveals the full meaning of experience,

A sense of beauty suffused his own personal experiences and allowed him to see the world in relation to the
universal consciousness of God. Man perceives the presence
of divine consciousness throughout reality with a sense of
the heart. The seat of man's cognitive life is his heart,
which includes the understanding as well as the will. By
defining grace as a "new simple idea," Edwards proposes that
it is a new principle of nature within man, and that it is
a taste for moral excellency which is specifically designated as love.
As a metaphysical principle, the consent to being is
an attempt to rethink the category of substance in terms
of relation. The truly significant fact of the doctrine
resides in an implicit theory of value-response--that
value is objectively rooted in God, and that everything
gives consent to it through man.
Edwards' theology is an effort to place Newtonian
physics into a wider frame of reference. He adapts the
concepts of atoms, space,and gravity to an organic meta' physics of consent. Divine creation is a diffusive process

of communication, and natural objects and events are called
"images or shadows" because they bear an intrinsic relation
to God's communicative nature. The specific agency of creation is to be found in the Incarnation, which is the capstone of his whole system of thought.
Experience has held a position of preeminence among
the major themes of American philosophy. The conclusion
of this paper is that Edwards' philosophy can be viewed
as the systematic explication of his doctrine of experience, and that it is possible to consider him an early
exponent of the American tradition which gives experience
a position of primacy in relation to thought.
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CHAPTER I
EDWARDS AS ARTIST. A POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION.
Current interest in the philosophical career of
Jonathan Edwards is part of a larger co-operative attempt
of political theorists, philosophers, theologians, and

historians to bring the full weight of their scholarly
understanding to bear on the colonial origins of American
civilization. We have perhaps reached that stage of
national consciousness where such an enterprise will yield
important results.in a comprehensive evaluation of America.
Hopefully, we in the Twentieth Century are sufficiently removed from our Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century forbears
to gain a meaningful perspective of their lives. Moreover,
it can be argued that we are better prepared than previous
generations to see Puritan life as an integral stage in the
development of contemporary America.
Two points should be made: that Edwards was an
original thinker of major importance, and that in the
range and depth of his thought he has particular relevance
in the mainstream of American thought. The originality and
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universality of Edwards is to be found, I believe, in his
synoptic view of the science, philosophy, and theology of
his time. His thought has contributed greatly to American

theory: the Calvinist approach to life as exemplified by
Edwards represents a major influence of early colonial
theology on later American thought. Thus, these early
writings should be evaluated to discover such a tradition

which was originally couched in theology and philosophy,
and yet forms a significant aspect of the fountainhead
in the mainstream of American theory.
When we look closely at his life and 'thought, we are
immediately struck by his immense preoccupation with experience. From the time of his childhood at East Windsor,
to his reading of Locke and Newton as a Yale student, to
his long pastorate at Northampton, and finally to his exile
at Stockbridge where he produced his best writing, the controlling theme of his life was experience. In his preaching and in his writing, he never permitted abstractness to
dominate at the expense of experience. One can discern
through this Calvinistic perspective that was Edwards' the
empirical flavor in his written works and in his sermons;

and if his writing is a gigantic cipher, as Perry Miller

'Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (Cleveland: Meridian,
1959), p. ii., See also A. €• McGifTert, Jonathan Edwards
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932) , p. 1~67
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suggests, then the key is to be discovered somewhere in
his rich sense of experience, of the presence of all
things in perception. Coupled with experience is another
theme: an intuitive awareness, almost poetic in nature,
that the world of perception is engulfed by a larger
reality which eludes direct perception, but is nevertheless present in it. What I am suggesting is a
symbolic awareness that the objects and events of
nature have their existence in relation to a wider
order which while not susceptible of direct perception
is indirectly perceived in some intuitive way as an
integral dimension of these things, To understand
Edwards* empiricism is to understand the nature of
this intuition; it is to recognize the marriage and
synthesis of Platonism and empiricism.
Taken together, the two themes of experience and
symbolic awareness constitute a manifestation of an even
more fundamental trait of his personality: an intense
awareness of beauty* The over-all purpose of this
paper is to demonstrate experience as the dominating
theme and vehicle of his life and thought, but this can
be achieved only through an appreciation of the importance of his aesthetic nature, Any claim to greatness that can be made for Edwards must rest squarely
on his extraordinary ability to perceive and to construct

9'stefMMEHmsunixivsaisfaasfSXiHmfis.

a philosophical-theological system on that perception.

2

The point of this preliminary discussion, to which
space will be devoted at the outset^ then, is to set
Edwards into some historical perspective, As a thinker
who broke new ground, he belongs to the Enlightenment.
However, he occupies a rather unique position in relation
to the Europeans who did not pass their lives in the New
England wilderness. This fact is decisive, and I would
hope to underscore it in my presentation of his aesthetic
nature.

The most important event of his intellectual life
occurred, by his own words, at Yale when he discovered
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding^ and the
possibilities offered by the new philosophy of empiricism.
It was also as a student that he had access to Newton's
Opticks and Principia, which were given to the infant
Connecticut college by the author. The reading of these
two giants of the Enlightenment were not isolated events.
Edwards suspected almost immediately that Newton's physics
and Locke's psychology were revolutions in the outer life
of the cosmos and the inner life of man which, taken
together, constituted the greatest single achievement of
the human intellect in the classical modern period. He

2

See: for a full discussion of this matter Roland A.
Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of Jonathan
Edwards (New Haven, Connecticut, 1968).
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set about to draw out the far-reaching implications this
revolution held for religious thought. A great deal of his
intellectual toil began here in the reading of Newton and
Locke. His adolescent genius produced the then brilliant
insight that physical science and the new empirical philosophy might be beautifully harmonized, indeed synthesized,
with his version of traditional Calvinism* The result of
his reading was marked by two precocious essays which he
wrote, "Notes on the Mind" and "Notes on Natural Science."
Using the formulae of Lockean psychology and Newtonian
science, he sketched out in these works all the major
themes that were to occupy his entire life; the consent
to being, the nature of virtue, idealism and empiricism;
the philosophical and theological interpretation of atoms,
space, and gravity; and his fundamental thoughts on God
and the nature of beauty and freedom.
But the most important event of his career at Yale
was not an intellectual experience at all, it was his
religious conversion. From this experience he committed
himself to religion as the main business of his life. The
importance of the conversion went far beyond his personal
spiritual life. "It became the cornerstone of his whole
structure of thought, determining the basis not only of
his revival preaching, but also of his religious philosophy"'

3^-

--.

.

Ola Wins low, Jonathan Edwards, 1703-1758, A Biography
(New York: Macmillan, 1941) , p. 75.
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He called upon his intellectual resources to translate
this new religious sense into a coherent and meaningful
doctrine. This became his life's work. "The Mind" and
"Natural Science" must be seen in the light of his religious
conversion and not apart from it. After this, nothing in

his life can be fully appreciated except in its religious
significance. There can be no question as to the religious thrust of his whole life. It was decisive. The
unity of his thought, the rationale of his entire system,
and the structure of his doctrine rest on a common denominator which is thoroughly religious.
Two facts merit mentioning here about Edwards' position in our intellectual and cultural history. First,
American scholarship is making either an appraisal or a
reappraisal of practically every facet of his mind to uncover his contribution to American philosophy, psychology
and theology. Second, one of the most prominent facts
uncovered in his biography is the role that aesthetic
feeling plays in the formation of his personality. Yet
little effort has been made to see the connection between
his place in American culture and his aesthetic nature
which enabled him to comment on the major aspects of the
American experience* Only a minority of scholars entertain the notion that he secured a permanent place in our
history as an artist, "one of America's five or six major
artists, who happened to work with ideas instead of with

novels•"'

Perry Miller claims that Edwards succeeded better
than any other artist "in generalizing his experience into
the meaning of America."" Professor Miller sees the case
for Edwards' modernity in his ability to speak out about
science and psychology with such universality that we in
the twentieth century are just catching up to him. He
was much more than a theologian, he was an artist who used
theology as his medium,
It is to Miller's credit to have inaugurated the
renascence of Edwardsean scholarship by approaching him
as an artist. Miller's genius is manifested by his sustained analysis of Edwards' thought to demonstrate that it
ranges far beyond the doctrinal limitations of Puritanism,
But criticism of his effort has not been lacking.

6

Vincent Buranelli, for example, praises Miller's

4.

Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. ii«

'Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. iii.
6The best example is Vincent Tomas, "The Modernity of
Jonathan Edwards," New England Quarterly, XXV (March, 1952),
60-84. For other discussions of Miller's treatment of Edwards, see the following reviews of his book: Joseph Haroutunian. Theology Today, VII (January, 1951), 554-556; Reinhold Niebu^r7-NatiorTTCLXIX (December 31, 1949), 648; Thomas H. Johnson, Saturday Review (January 7, 1950), 17; R.W.B.
Lewis, "The Drama of Jonathan Edwards," Hudson Review, III
(1950), 135-40; Mary Ellen Chase, Review of Jonathan Edwards,
New York Times Book Review (December 11, 1949), 4; Orvill^
Prescott, Review of Jonathan Edwards, New York Times (December 7, 1949), 29; J. H. NTchols,"Review of Jonathan Edwards, Church History, XX (December, 1951), 75-T2T

8
scholarship but feels some uneasiness about his "highly
personalized" interpretation*' He fears, as other critics
do, that the line between Edwards' and Miller's own thought
is blurred beyond discernment. This approach makes it dif-

ficult to distinguish his understanding of Edwards from his
own original and quite subtle philosophy. Nevertheless,
Buranelli is quite correct in saying that anyone who takes
issue with aspects of Miller's version of Edwards is obliged
to show why. While he has opened up the category of experience more than anyone else, and has pioneered the
interpretation of Edwards as an artist making larger pronouncements on American life, he has not argued their full
significance. In Miller's genius we also find a deficiency.
He fails to appreciate fully that if Edwards can be seen
as an artist, the philosophical consequences of such a conclusion must be researched in terms of Edwards' aesthetic
intuition. Most essentially, he has not understood how
thorough-going an artist Edwards was; and how style, method,
and content are fused into a single metaphysical doctrine.
This would seem an essential question to be investigated
in order to unearth the guiding assumptions of Jonathan
Edwards' philosophy,
Henry Bamford Parkes proposes a thesis similar to

'Vincent Buranelli, "Colonial Philosophy," William
and Mary Quarterly, third series, XVI (July, 1959), 358.
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Miller's, but less comprehensive in scope. He sees the
meaning of Edwards' thought ranging far beyond the boundaries of eighteenth century Puritanism• The whole American
experience is mirrored with remarkable clarity in his
theology, which was "a symbolic expression of the deep
psychic forces" rooted in American culture, As a poet,
he ranks with the great writers of the nineteenth century
in foreshadowing the major themes of our national literature.

On the one hand his doctrine of a spiritual and

divine light immediately imparted to the soul
pointed toward Emerson and Whitman, On the other
hand his intoxication with the idea of omnipotence,
the cruelty that it implied, and the overweening
pride of logic with which he set out to explain
the entire universe, represented tendencies that
pervaded the writings of Poe and Melville.8
However interesting it may be , Parkes' thesis is weakened
by the assumption that Edwards' doctrine is characterized
by a fundamental split. It takes for granted that the overweening pride of logic and the cruel Calvinist omnipotence
are locked in mortal combat with the spiritual and divine
light. Undoubtedly, there is stress within the soul of
Edwards, but it is translated too easily into a major
ambivalence of the American psyche. Parkes* analysis
is too facile for an enormously complex mind, and not
necessarily a true characterization of the Puritan

'Henry Bamford Parkes, The American Experience

(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947), p/ 83.
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intellect. It does not penetrate to the unique and undivided source of Edwards' intellectual and moral energy.
Parkes in no way demonstrates that he has grasped the center
of his vision. He fails to appreciate the aesthetic intuition, below the surface of awareness, which sparked the
symbolic imagination of Edwards into a single, unified
vision of a beautiful world.
The experience of beauty dominated Edwards to a greater extent than is commonly suspected. It is a basic concept to which we must return again and again if we would
hope to appreciate the center of his vision. We can almost
say his life was spent in constant analysis and clarification of this idea of beauty, or excellence, as he was
accustomed to call it. Time and again, Edwards' critics
have marveled at such an anomalous task for a Puritan
theologian, "Esthetic categories are the last which one

might expect to find in a rigid Calvinist philosophy,

9

written in New England, by a Puritan of Puritans."' The
explanation lies largely in Edwards' own personality,
nourished by the frontier. A wilderness experience
dominated and nurtured his aesthetic sensibility, giving
shape to his theory of beauty and his pattern of philosophy*
The complete expression of his philosophy, then, was unquestionably a product of a life passed in rich experience

9

Herbert Schneider, The Puritan Mind (New York:
Henry Holt, 1930) p. 142.

-^
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and purified by a process of distillation of an intense
aesthetic awareness.
We find Edwards' qualification as an artist in his
ability to articulate the deepest forces of his age and
his culture in the setting of colonial, Calvinist America,
No one can be more in time and place than the artist, for
it is his unique vocation to bring to acute personal consciousness the total complexity of his historical situation.
While the philosopher or the statesman may represent an
abstracted awareness of one or another aspect of that
mitieu, the artist is the total living personification
of it. His expression may be abstract, but he seeks to

find the embodiment of ideas in empirically verifiable
forms. He comes closest to a living, symbolic articulation
of the culture in all its complexity, in all its ambivalencey and in all its passion. No writer "ever emerged
more directly out of the passions, the feuds, and the
.10

anxieties of his society." I would add that no individual in eighteenth century New England understood this
better, or was as conscious of his relation to society
than Edwards. His imposing philosophical-theological

edifice testifies to an artistic intuition in keeping
with the demands of his age.
The reassessment of Edwards has produced an assortment of diverse philosophical categories for which he seems

10.... \

'Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 1.
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to qualify. They range from Miller's judgment that he was
preeminently a naturalist to the less extreme and more
traditional view that he was an xlealist. Others have
called him a pantheist, a mystic, a monist, an empiricist,
and even a medieval scholastic, or platonist. Whatever
the classification, one cannot ignore the dominance of
his religious consciousness and the aesthetic sensibility
which characterized that consciousness. These two facts
of his intellectual biography loom over all other facts.
He was a mystic who thought that he experienced the presence
of divine beauty in the world. If religious conversion gave
him a mystical sense of God, then he brought to it a new
doctrine of experience. Here is the uniqueness of Edwards.
For it allowed him to comprehend the world by means of experience which uses the empiricism of Locke as its point of
departure. The following pages are designed to establish
a vital link between his mysticism, and faith, and the
empirical element in his epistemology, thus isolating the
structure of Edwards' rational perspective and its guiding
assumptions.
This work will trace the empirical turn his religious
mysticism took when it confronted the requirements of
Lockean analysis and the resulting doctrine is completed
in the affective epistemology which he calls "a sense of
the heart," and in his interpretation of grace as a "new
simple idea." We shall then study the extensions of

-J^fn—nurii..-.
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experience into metaphysics (showing that the consent to
being entails a direct perception of God in His Imminence
and TranscendenceL Such an approach and the conclusions
to be drawn will show Jonathan Edwards the artist and
empiricist not only representing the Calvini^t-Puritan
period to historians, but more importantly, how he both
can be characterized as an artist and as a major contributor to the early origins of what was to become the
mainstream of American thought.

te-a^.

CHAPTER 11
PURITAN MYSTICISM

The cosmological view of Edwards is similar in many
ways to the Aristotelian and especially the Neo-Platonism
which shaped the theology and cosmology of the Middle Ages.
This similarity is far from sheer historical accident, for
the connections between medieval and Puritan thought are
strong. To a greater extent than is commonly suspected,
the theological heritage of the Puritans was medieval in
origin. Their overt distaste for some of the surviving
practices of scholasticism was in keeping with the spirit
of the Reformation and with their adaptation of Ramist
logic. But this could not hide the marked influence of
medieval Neo-Platonism on their thought. In spite of their
constant denunciation. Perry Miller writes, "the settlers
of New England retained with few alterations the cosmology
of the Middle Ages."~ In fact, the influence has been far
greater on seventeenth century Puritanism than on sixteenth
century Protestantism in general. Ralph Barton Perry

'Pe^ry Miller^ The New England, (4ind« ,The Seventeenth
Century (Boston: Beduun 'Pryy's^ 1961), p. IG^T-

i
*-»»«^.-_-
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argues that "the main body of puritan doctrine < • • is
medieval Christianity. In America, it was the chief link

2

of continuity with the medieval past."" And Miller further
claims that "at every turn we encounter ideas and themes
which descend • • • from medieval philosophy,""
The medieval mind sought to harmonize all knowledge
with Christian revelation and to fuse it into a single view
of reality. The age was marked by the attempt to use all
the disciplines to portray the.cosmos as a divine presence.
All knowledge is one, and it bespeaks a theophanic world*
In the seventeenth century, too, the theophanic theme prevailed, and men sought to probe the mystery of God's
infinity through science and mathematics, The theme is at
the heart of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza,.Cudworth,
H. More, Leibniz, and the natural philosophy of Newton.
The Puritans were no exception to their age: they also
sought to unify the various disciplines into a single
religious vision not unlike the theophanic cosmologies
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
The term cosmology is used here in the general sense
of a unified way of viewing the world. It has a wider
scope than metaphysics, for it includes theology and

2_ . . _

Ralph Barton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy
York: Vanguard, 1944), p. 83<

3

The New England Mind. The Seventeenth Century,

p. 104,

_.*t>?B!P»»
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mythology as well as philosophy, and is generally considered
to be an entirely experiential orientation to the world
rather than a conceptual one. The concern of the present
chapter, then, is to show that central to Edwards* cosmology
is a Neo-Platonism which evolved through the Middle Ages.
But first it is necessary to establish the connection
between Puritanism and medieval Neo-Platonism in a more
specific way. A great deal of attention has been paid in
recent years to Puritan mysticism in the seventeenth
century. That there was a mystic strain in the Puritan
movement of that time is evidenced by the emergence of such
groups as the Quakers with their strong belief in the mystic

brotherhood of man and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in
each individual. "There have been few periods in any
country/' one author tells us, "that have been so intensely

and profoundly mystical as was (the) first half of the
,4

seventeenth century."' Unlike earlier versions of mysticism,
this one seemed to reach into the hearts of ordinary men
and to establish itself as the basis for popular political
democracy. It originated and grew out of the Puritan
religion itself, but its roots sank deep into the medieval
past.
The mystical element of Puritanism was one readaptation of Puritan piety, theology, and polity

4

Rufus M. Jones, Mysticism and Democracy in the English
Commonwealth (Cambridge: Harvard Univers i^fc.y Press f 193 2) ,
p. 12.

sKvvwsyis'amf^yiHevi'smvstsessssesss^^
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which grew out of a scriptural literalism and
was also an antidote for extreme literalism
an<^ legalism . • . • Springing primarily from
Dionysius, the medieval German mystics, the
Germanspiritualist, Jacob Boehme, and the
Family of Love.5
William Haller*s testimony concurs with this belief that
while it was an indigenous phenomenon. Puritan mysticism
was also the reappearance of an older tradition,
One source for it was undoubtedly to be found
in feelings among the people that reached far
back into medieval popular Christian faith.
However that may be, the fact is at any rate
significant that, in addition to the sermons
and polemics of preachers • • • there began
to appear in England after 1600 vernacular
versions of the writings of continenfcal^enthusiasts and mystics of an older time.
There is much evidence to support the claim that
mysticism was not alien to Puritanism, but that it
sprouted from the main stock of early Puritan orthodoxy.
At its incipient stage in the sixteenth century, the
Puritan religion was already producing an element which
stressed the supremacy of experience over reason, and
immediacy over remoteness in theological matters,

7

(3Jerald €• Brauer/ "Puritan Mysticism and the Development of Liberalism," Church History, XIX (Sept,, p. 152)
'William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism (New York:

Columbia University Press/ 1938) / p.206.
'Winthrop C< Hudson, "Mystical Religion in the Puritan
Commonwealth," Journal of Religion, XXVIII (January^ 1948),
51-56. "The early impetus to mystical religion in Puritanism
was rooted in an intense interest in practical piety, a religion of the heart as opposed to an intellectual faith. By
the end of the sixteenth century, one element in the Puritan
movement was moving in the direction of a pietistic emphasis
on immediacy in religion, stressing direct communion with
God, and characterized by an insistence upon personal expGi-icncG <

Rwv^fwiwwas^
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In his effort to purge religion of all intermediaries between
the individual and God," whether it be priest, saint, or an
ecclesiastical hierarchy, the Puritan came to value direct,
personal experience of God more and more. With the growth
of Puritanism in the seventeenth century, experience came
to the fore even more as a primary authority. Their theological interest was not dogmatic, but experiential, according to Geoffrey Nuttall. "There is theology, but, in a way
which has hardly been known since St, Augustine • • • •
This stress on experience is, indeed, a characteristic of
the seventeenth century in England."

.9

It might be said of Puritanism that one of its significant and distinguishing features was its insistence
that man could establish a direct, experiential relation
to Gody a relation in which the emotions played as
important a role as reason, if not more so. The awakening of a new sense of religion with its stress on the
personal rather than the institutional element brought
new meaning to the gospel story, and a fresh approach
to the way in which the Christian message was to be
witnessed. The walls of separation between God and man
which for centuries had been maintained by ecclesiastical

8

R, B. Perry, p. 364 .

9

Geoffrey F. Nuttall, The Holy Spirit in Puritan
Faith and Experience (Oxford^Basil Blackwell, 1946) ,
PP. 6-7.

A^.^
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authority were now removed, and man discovered in a new way
that the gospel was a powerful and saving £orc@. "It was
insufficient to contemplate and adore God as the Creator,
eternal but distant in the heavens. God must be found in
direct personal experience, present now by His Holy Spirit
in the heart, making men able to say with Job, 'I have
heard of thee by the hearing of an ear; but now mine eye
seeth thee.'"10
Nuttall*s thesis is substantiated in the writings
of the leading Puritan thinkers of the seventeenth century,
men such as Richard Sibbes, John Preston, and Thomas Goodwinf who forged the theology of the Covenant which became
the foundation of all Puritan belief," Their appeal to
experience over reason in matters of faith is quite strong,
as for example, Sibbes ' distinction between notional and
discursive knowledge. The latter he calls "knowledge
with a taste." God gives to man knowledge per modum gustus
which cannot be replaced with any weaker form.
There is no other principle to prove the word,
but experience from the working of it < • . •
Experience is the life of a Christian. What ^
is all knowledge of Christ without experience?'

loNuttall, p. 135.
11-
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See Perry Miller, "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity/
Errand into Wilderness" (Cambridge/ Mass.: The Belknap
Press y-19 56^ , ^pp^—4^-^8 •
12^., ,

Sibbes, quoted in Nuttall, p. 39,
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Goodwin follows, closely by referring also to knowledge as a
form of taste:
God hath put into every creature a taste, and
a discerning of what shall nourish it. • • •
And as the senses in a man are suited to objects
in the world, a man's eyes to colours, his ears
to sounds, his stomach to meats, so hath God made
the things of the gospel to suit the regenerate
part, and the regenerate part to suit them • • • ,
in Philippians i.9. The knowledge of the saints
it is called sense . • • it is a judgment which
ariseth from^ or at least is joined with sense,
a taste, a suitableness that the soul hath to
things revealed.13
The great architect of covenant theology, John Preston, whose
work. The New CpyenanJ:, is prerequisite to any understanding
of the thought of seventeenth century New England/

14

similarly emphasizes the knowledge of God by experience*
"The workes of Nature are not in vain," he tells us, for
"when a man lookes on the great volume of the world, there
those things which God will have known, are written in
capital letters." While some truths are wholly revealed
by God through Scripture, there are other truths "that have
some vestigis, some characters stamped upon the creature,
whereby we may discerne them, and such is this which we
now have in hand, that, there is a God."

'Goodwin, quoted in Nuttall, p. 39.
'Miller, "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity," Errand
into the Wilderness, p. 59.
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Preston, quoted by Miller, Ibid,, p. 77. »
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The best account of the development of covenant
theology in the seventeenth century has been given by
Perry Miller. The theme of his remarkable essay, "The
Marrow of Puritan Divinity," focuses on the covenant as
a device to bring an inscrutable Calvinistic God into a
reasonable relationship with man. The arbitrary God of
sixteenth century Calvinism has to be made more reasonable
and more accessible to man through the ordinary channels
of human experience. Thus the idea of God and man entering into a compact emerged slowly but surely in the minds
of Puritans, and the mysteriously transcend&nt and arbitrary deity became less unpredictable and more amenable
to the demands that human experience made of him. Our
stereotyped image of the Puritan conception of God as
severe, inflexible, and quite un approach able is inconsistent with the notion of a God who has arranged a
reasonable agreement with man about the terms of salvation, and who acts for the most part within the boundaries
of that agreement. Miller points out that it is wrong to
suppose that Puritan doctrine in the seventeenth century
was a rigid authoritarianism which prescribed dogmatic
truths about a harsh and tyrannical Supreme Being. "We
ought to be very much disconcerted by their continual
appeals to experience and reason" if we persist in using
this stereotype.*" To such a devout Puritan as Edwards,

16...-.

Miller, quoting Preston, p. 70.
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the God of the covenant made himself increasingly available
to man through his ordinary faculties, and so experience
became a reliable measure of God's character and of his

17

chosen way of carrying on commerce with man.""

This notable emphasis on experience is attributable
in great measure to the influence of Neo-Platonism, If

18

there was a definite mystical strain in Puritanism,~~ as
all evidence seems to show, then it was due in great part
to a familiarity with and dependent on Neo-Platonic thought.
Indeed, Perry Miller has shown that the greatest single
influence on Puritan thought, excluding the Bible, was not
19

_

...

.

Calvin so much as it was Augustine."' But their knowledge
of Augustine and of Plato had been heavily colored by the

20

Cambridge Platonists,~" and by such Renaissance thinkers

21

as Ficino, Mirandola, and Cusa«-- And so while the works

Miller, quoting Preston, pp. 63, 65.
^A pioneering study of the origins of Puritan mysticism has been done by Jerald C« Brauer, "Francis Rous,
Puritan Mystic, 1579-1659: An Introduction to the Mystical
Element in Puritanism." Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 1948.
' Millerr The New England Mind. The Seventeenth
Century, p. 4^
'See Clarence Gohdes, "Aspects of Idealism in Early
New England," The Philosophical Review, XXXIX (November,
1930) , 537-555".—:
21_

'See Jones, pp. 107-108.
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of Plato, Plotinus , and the Pseudo-Dionysius were in the
22 ..

Harvard and Yale libraries," they included commentaries by
Ficino and by the Cambridge school of Cudworth, More, Glanvill, and Theophilus Gale. The writings of Edwards, for
example, testify to his dependence on Cudworth and Gate.
The Puritan's interpretation of Plato and Augustine
was thoroughly mystical. It can be shown to what extent
they had read and absorbed the great Neo-Platonic mystics

of the Middle Ages• They had the opportunity to read the
Pseudo-Dionysius when John Everard translated his Mystxcal
Theology into English, and they had access to Nicholas of
Cusa*s Vision of God which Everard translated along with
24 _

Giles Randall."" Francis Rous, who is called the first
Puritan mystic, quoted Dionysius frequently, and cited

25

Augustine more often than he cited Calvin."" He
moved into mysticism "not through the influence of near
contemporary Continental thinkers and movements but through
Puritanism itself bolstered by reading such men as Plato,
22_
'Gohdes, p. 542.

'An excellent study of the effect on Edwards of the
Cambridge Platonists has been done by Emily Watts, "Jonathan Edwards and the Cambridge Platonists." Unpublished
doctoral thesis. University of Illinois, Urbana, 1963.
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'Jones, p. 64, and Haller, p. 206.

'Brauer, "Francis Rous, Puritan Mystic, 1579-1659:
An Introduction to the Mystical Element in Puritanism,"
p. 52.
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Augustine, Gregory and Bernard—all of whom had been available t6 Puritans at all times,""" Cotton Mather is known fco
have purchased the works of Dionysius for his library in
1682.""

There is clearly an abundance of evidence that the
Puritans had first hand contact with medieval mysticism, and
that in their sense of God's immediacy they had close affinities with this older tradition. It would be strange indeed
if we were to find no mysticism in a religion which was as
emotional and as experiential (in its incipient stages, at
least) as Puritanism.
In turning our attention to Edwards, we discover an
individual who by temperament was disposed to religious
mysticism. His insistence on real assent to the truths of
God is extended so as to become the central theme not only
of his personal religious life, but also of his epistemological, metaphysical and moral speculations, Whether he
discusses knowledge as a species of affection, or the consent to being as an ontological category, or the sense of
the heart as essential to our knowledge of God, Edwards
seems to be promoting the logic of experience over purely
ontological reasoning. He seems to be inspired by a
fundamental difference between the two ways of knowing,

'Brauer, p. 33.

FGohdes, p. 538.
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and by the primacy of one way over the other in most matters
of importance. The stronger form of knowledge is based on
observation and is to be preferred to knowledge which is
based exclusively on some form of ontological insight.
Thus, he writes:
There is a difference between having an opinion,
that God is holy and gracious, and having a sense
of the loveliness and beauty of that holiness an<3.
grace. There is a difference between having a
rational judgment that honey is sweet, and having
a sense of its sweetness. A man may have the former, that knows not how honey tastes; but a man cannot have the latter unless he has an idea of the
taste of honey in his mind,28
Edwards shares a Dionysian view of a world which is
the diffusion of God's being. The universe acts, he tells
us f as if it were "animated and directed by one common
soul," and the reality of God interpenetrates all creation
so as to constitute a single order. And yet God is at the
same time utterly transcendent and utterly inaccessible as
He is in Himself. Like Dionysius and the entire mystical
tradition, Edwards refuses to compromise aryone aspect
of the universe to any other aspect. He tries to do justice to them all and to maintain, in however paradoxical
a form, a world which is at once the living presence of
its Source but not totally identified with it.
For example, the groundwork of Edwards' system is
laid out in the doctrine of an Absolute God, an eternal,

Works (Dwight ed<) VI, p. 177.
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infinite, omnipotent and omniscient being. He insisted on
and emphasized divine sovereignty, not only because the
tenets of Calvinism dictated it, but also because the universe demanded it< The world of Edwards' experience was
precarious and exhibited an unbridled ruthlessness and
arbitrariness. This was especially true of a life spent
in the New England wilderness. There had to be a theological accounting for this aspect of the cosmos, and he went
to the orthodox Calvinist doctrines of divine wrath, divine
election, and original sin. He would not gloss over such
realities as suffering, injustice/ and inequality, but
would give them their full sway.
Nevertheless, it may be said that he constantly strove
to readapt the principles of Calvinism along the lines of
Neo-Platonism. Thus, God, as the transcendent, superabundant Good is the first cause of all that exists. But
his sovereignty, Edwards insists, must be maintained above
all other considerations. There can be no "indigence,
insufficiency and mutability in God, or any dependence
29 _ -

of the Creator on the creature."""" God could not have
created out of any deficiency in His nature, but only
out of the super-abundance of His Goodness. His motive
in creating does not go beyond Himself, and His desire to
communicate is a manifestation of a "supreme and ultimate

29

The Works of President Edwards (8 volumes; Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 18.09), VI, p. 21.
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regard to himself."
But God's nature is alt communicability, and the universe is the "glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good,""* It is God expressing Himself
through the multiplicity of finite forms. He speaks out
of the fullness of His nature and not out of any deficiency
or lack* Therefore, the universe is a continuous statement
about the plenitude of God, a divine declaration of His
inner nature which man stands in the presence of. It speaks
to man of the immeasurable and inexhaustible creative energy
of Divine Love or Goodness. The Neo-Platonic tradition is
marked by the identification of Goodness as the first source
of all things. A, 0. Lovejoy remarks in connection with
Dionysius that "God's 'love' • • • consists primarily rather
in the creative or generative than in the Redemptive or
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providential office of deity."'"' In the universe of Edwards,
the attribute of Goodness or Love means more than passive
compassion or a sort of reflex action God might have to man's
condition. It means the creative energy and vital force
which sustains all things in existence. Edwards is true
to the Neo-Platonic tradition to the point of using the
metaphor of light as his prime example of what is meant by

'Thomas, p. 34<

31Thomas, p. 33
'A. 0« Love joy. The Great Chain of Being. A Study of
the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1936), p. 67.
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divine emanation. To illustrate the manner of the emanation
of God'3 Goodness, he points to the way in which the sun
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radiates heat and light•""

The communication of Goodness results in an hierarchieal order which stretches from the lowest forms of
inanimate matter to man who is "the highest of creatures."
It is based on the relative nearness or remoteness of
every creature to God. But the important fact of Edwards'
idea of hierarchy is that the entire scale is mediated by
communication to produce an inter-related world reaching
from God, through man, and down into the lower levels.
Thus:
In the creation there is an immediate communication between one degree of being and the next degree
of being. Every wheel immediately communions with
the next wheel, man being at the top. Without doubt
there is an immediate communication between the
Creator and this highest of creatures according to
the order of being<34
Every other creature participates in this immediate communication between God and man according to the degree of
its own capacity* The capacity is determined by the
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'See Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God
Created the World, Works, Worcester ed., VI passim. Also,
Iinage s 6¥ ~Sh adow s of Divine Things, Perry MiTFer^ed. ,
(Hew HavenTYaFe^Um/ve rs i ty^) res s^, 1948), p. 64.
'The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from His Private
N otebooks, Harvey Townsend, editor fEugene, OregonV University of Oregon Press, 1955), p. 127.
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position the creature occupies in the hierarchy. There is
in Edwards, then, a principle of continuity which sees a
cosmic.unity brought about through divine communication.
God*s work from the beginning of the universe
to the end, and in all parts of the universe appears to be but one. It is all one design carried
on, one affair managed, in all God's dispensations
towards all intelligent beings, viz. the glorifying and conununication of himself in and through
his Son Jesus Christ as God ^n, and by the work
of redemption of fallen man.
But this unity is achieved in the immediate communication
between God and man. The principle of continuity throughout
the universe is made possible through man in his immediate
relation to God. And when Edwards speaks of immediate
communication, he refers to some form of experience,
This brief glimpse info some of the basic ways in
which the cosmos appeared to Edwards prompts the following
general observations. First, he is essentially committed
to giving full consideration to all aspects of the relationship between God and His world* This means accepting His
sovereignty and transcendence as a primary state, but at
the same time seeing that the full meaning of transcendence
resides in its relation to the opposite pole of finite
existence. In other words. God*s sovereignty and transcendence are intelligble only insofar as they can be seen
in relation to His immediacy and imminence."" Second, with

35Works, (Dwight ed.) VIII/ p. 521.
36Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers
Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953),
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such a view it is but a short step to depicting the world
as a dynamic affair of mutual interdependencies in which
the concept of knowledge becomes infused with affection,

CHAPTER III
EXPERIENCE AND THE DECLINE OF PURITAN
DOCTRINE—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Before proceeding to an examination of Edwards' doctrine of experience and the role it played in his metaphysical theology, it is important to comment on the more
general features of Puritanism in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. By the time Edwards appeared on the
scene, the rudiments of Puritan belief had undergone drastic
changes at the hands of time and experience. Upon graduation from Yale, Edwards steppes into a world in which Puritanism had been eroded by a century of the struggle for
survival in New England. His own doctrine of experience
was as much a direct conscious response to this struggle
as it was a result of it. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand the status of theology at this time if we hope
to gain a full appreciation of his position.
There is a tendency to view history in terms of a
separate series of events, the segments having very few
or no important connections between them. But when one
sees the Puritan migration of 1630, along with the other
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collateral events of the seventeenth century, the story
constitutes a major chapter in the history of ideas. The
history of the Bay Colony must be viewed as an important
aspect of the Christian drama of that period. Reformed
Christendom, according to the Puritans, had not achieved
a sufficient purity enabling it to recover the spirit of
the primitive Church. Anglicanism was a case in point.
Retaining much of the character of the Roman Church, it
tended to minimize the Bible as the essential source of
God's message to man. The Puritans moved to the opposite
extreme and believed that Scripture contained the complete
word of God, replete with a moral and social prescription
for human life.
The difference between the Anglican and the
Puritan . • • was that the Puritan thought the
Bible, the revealed word of God, was the word
of God from one end to the other, a complete
body of laws, an absolute code in everything it
touched upon; the Anglican thought this a rigid,
doctrinaire, and utterly unjustifiable extension
of the authority of scripture. The Puritan held
the Bible was sufficiently plain and explicit so
that men • • • could establish its meaning and
intention on every subject, not only in theology,
military tactics, inheritances, profits, marriages
and judicial procedure ••L
Perry Miller reminds us that they were incurably authoritarian in their attitude toward the Bible. "There was
nothing essential to be learned outside revelation."

"Perry Miller and Thomas Johnson, The Puritans (2 vols.;
rev. ed.; New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), I, p. 43.
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And yet Scripture did not contain the complete word of God,
for the Puritans maintained a belief that God's nature is
always partly hidden from man,
One important result of this belief was their "discovery" that the Bible contained the outline for the
organization of the visible church. At the heart of the
discovery was the idea of a covenant between God and man,
The covenant brought men together, into a gathered church,
to form a Bible Commonwealth. This was one of the prime
motives of the 1630 migration to America, and it formed the

2

basis of the Puritan theology of community-building." Massachusetts would become a "City upon a Hill," a "Model of
Christian Charity" for all the world to behold. ~ They went
about their task with an intense religious zeal that makes
it impossible for us to ignore. "It is notorious," says
Santayana, "how metaphysical was the passion that drove
the puritans to those shores." They went to fulfill a
spiritual mission to achieve an authentic Christian life.

2^ . . _

Daniel Booratin, The Americans. The Colonial Experience. (New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 15-16.
^Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.:
The Belknap Press, 1956), p. 11, "Winthrop and his colleagues • • • believed their errand was not a mere scouting
expedition: it was an essential maneuver in their drama of
Christendom. The Bay Company was not a battered remnant of
suffering Separatists thrown upon a rocky shore? it was an
organized task force of Christians , executing a flank attack
on the corruptions of Christendom. These Puritans did not
flee to America; they went in order to work that complete
reformation which was not yet accomplished in England and
Europe•"
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But their mission was not finished when they succeeded in
establishing their churches, for "an endless migration of
the mind was still before them."
Indeed the great enterprise was not over after the
first generation entrenched itself in New England, but by
1660, it had altered radically. The endless migration of
the mind was, in fact, the far greater challenge of coming
to terms with an entirely new experience. The Puritans soon
realized that the hazards of life in the wilderness surpassed those of living with the Anglican Church in England.
At this point experience gained the upper hand over religious doctrine, and the process began of modifying theology
to meet the demands of their new life.
The day-to-day struggle to survive in the wilderness
worked a curious revolution on the Puritans. For them, the
overwhelming fact of experience was a cruel, hostile and
very demanding frontier environment.
They felt the impact of primeval nature —
suffered its dangers and hardships , responded
to its challenge, and exploited its resources.

4

George Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United
States (New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 3. James~Trus low
Adams has argued in The Founding of New England (Boston:
The Atlantic Monthly Press 7 T9^1), tKat religious motives
played a minor role in the settling of the Bay Colony, that
the Puritans sought economic and imperial gains from their
migration. This interpretation is challenged by Miller,
in his Orthodoxy in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass,? Harvard UnFversity Press, 1933).
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They were vividly aware of the 'wilderness* in
which their lot was cast; and in terms of this
encounter they dramatized both theip hardshijps^
and their providential opportunity."
This last point made the difference between surviving and
perishing during those first years. For the sake of sheer
physical survival they were forced to dramatize their
hardships through religious experience, to see that every
turn of events held a symbolic meaning. "It was almost
impossible for the Puritans to take America on its own
hostile terms•"" The terms had to be dictated, and they
had to be Christian. More specifically, they had to be the
terms of the Covenant. So as the second and third generation Puritans lost sight of the original mission of building a model community for Europe, their lives assumed new
religious meaning. Here, in New England's "green and
pleasant land," they were brought by God to build a New
Jerusalem. The American frontier was a re-enactment of the
Biblical frontier. Their real mission, after ally was to
conquer a wilderness, to subdue and Christianize it there,

'R. B. Perry, op. cit,, p. 204. (Italics mine). See
also Miller, The New England Mind. From Colony to Province
(Boston: Beacon Press / 1961), p. 14, "With their articulated sciences of theology, psychology, logic, and rhetoric
. . • they possessed coherent answers to all conceivable con-

tingencies. But one thing they had not foreseen, was that
experience in the New World might pose problems not on the
schedule, which appeared to have no rationale whatsoever.
(Italics mine) •
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'Stow Persons, American Minds. A History of^_I de as^

(New York: Henry Holt, 1958), p. 72.
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by physically reconstructing Canaan in America.
"New England was born in a passion of spiritual pioneering/' Lucy Lockwood Hazard tells us, "which almost
obscured the aspects of the actual frontier."' In their
need to assimilate a new experience into a religious framework, the Puritans acquired a symbolic awareness which
launched America on its mission of recreating the Promised
Land. Thus, the theology of community-building became a
permanent institution. With an intense awareness of the
religious drama they were participating in, "forest,
rivers, and mountains (became) symbols, and objects of con-

8

temptation•" Nature was the nev/ source of corroboration
that their adventure was part of a divine mission. With an

9

Hebraic sense of the holiness of matter," the Puritans
pictured themselves as on a Biblical odyssey into the
American wilderness. The following is an apt summary:
In the everyday life of New England images like
•The Holy Commonwealth' and the 'Wars of the Lord*
converted human activity into a symbolic drama.
New England was 'the place where the Lord will
create a new Heaven, and a new Earth in, new
Churches, and a new Commonwealth together.' The
unfolding drama was at once human and divine;

^The Frontier in American Literature (New York:
Frede ri ck Ungar-7-T9 ZT) , p. 162.
8R. B. Perry, p. 205.
'Santayana, p« 12.
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physical life was simultaneously spiritual.
Every passage of life, enmeshed in the vast
context of God's plan, possessed a delegated
meaning. Under the aspect of the Holy Commonwealth, the crude huts and muddy streets
were transmogrified into a focal symbol of
God*s emerging idea; 'We are as a City upon
an hill, in the open view of all th^earth,
the eyes of the world are upon us*'
What Perry Miller and others have called the decline
of doctrine in the seventeenth century was really a series
of theological adjustments to the new experience. The Puritan version of Calvinism proved itself exceptionally flexible and equal to the uncertainties of life on the frontier.
The flagging religious fervor of the second and third generations and the jeremiad it evoked from their preachers were
more than signals of decline. They hinted that something
more important than mere compromise of doctrine to the situation was taking place. For these events heralded the beginning of a new era in which religion would accede to the
demands of expansive experience. From this time on,
America became a laboratory to demonstrate that religious
experience thrives when it is called upon to cope with a
dynamic and changing situation. In New England Puritanism
we have the beginning of a truly experimental religion. As
one writer says: "Recent studies have made abundantly clear
• . • that the Puritan system of thought was dynamic, active,

'Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 79-80.
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experiential, and even experimental in a theological
sense •""'" Even truth itself, the revealed word of God,
was a dynamic concept. The Puritans believed that the
Bible contained the sum of truth and the entire prescription
for human life. But their conception of Scripture, as we
have seen, went far beyond the limits of the written word.
It embraced the whole of the human historical experience.
And they were a part of that Bible experience, in fact, a
most important part.
How did they arrive at such an arresting view of the
Bible" The answer is to be found in the Puritan interpretation of Calvinism. New England theology was not a simple and
complete reduplication of Genevan dograa. The process of

modifying this dogma had begun long before the first Puritan
reached these shores. It began earlier in the seventeenth
century when Reformation polemics had acquired a sophistication quite beyond that of Luther and Calvin. Calvinism
needed to be rescued from the charge of dogmatism, and it
needed to be rendered more humanistic. "In some fashion
the transcendent God had to be chained, made less inscrutable, less mysterious, less unpredictable -- He had to be
,12

made, again, understandable in human terms."

'R« R. Steams, "Assessing the New England Mind,"
Church History, X, (September, 1941), p. 248.
'Miller, "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity," Errand
Into the Wilderness, p. 55.
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A way of achieving this was devised by a group of
English Calvinists, William Perkins, John Preston, William
13 _.

Ames, and Richard Stibbes.*" They forged the doctrine of
the Covenant out of an interpretation of the Bible as the
historical record of God's covenants with man. The initial
impact with Adam was a Covenant of works, for God agreed to
reward Adam upon the performance of certain prescribed
duties. This failed, so God entered into another agreement
with man in his fallen state, called the Covenant of Grace.
The terms were first drawn upon with Abraham. God guarantees the reward of salvation to man upon the fulfillment
of the only act he is now capable of — faith in the mediatorship of Christ in man's behalf before God in the Final
Judgment. In Abraham's case it was an act of faith in
the anticipated Redemption. In our case it is faith in
the accomplished fact.
A most important aspect of this covenant is the obligation incurred by both signatories. Neither God nor man can
violate its conditions.
It has pleased the great God to enter into a
treaty and covenant of agreement with us his
poor creatures, the articles of which agreement
are here comprised. God, for his part, undertakes to convey all that concerns our happiness,
upon our receiving of them, by believing on him.

'Miller suggests they form a school, along with their
New England counterparts, John Cotton, Thomas Ehaprd, Thomas
Hooker, and Peter Bulkley.
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Every one in particular that recites these
articles from a spirit of faith makes good
this condition. •L4
The guarantees exacted from God in the covenant have a
moderating influence on His arbitrary nature. If He
would bind Himself to a compact. He would appear to be a
more reasonable being than Calvin had portrayed. And as
a reasonable being He governed and regulated all things
by the laws of nature that were being discovered by Seventeenth Century Science. Far from being inimicaJ- to science.
these Calvinists saw the covenant as a way of reconciling
religion to the rapid development of science. God's reasonableness was demonstrated further by the way He chose to disclose the terms of the compact. He allowed it to develop
slowly through time, so as to use history as the vehicle
by which man becomes educated to its terms• Hence , the
doctrine of history is intrinsic to the covenant, and it
enabled the Puritans to welcome every historical advance,
including science and mathematics by means of such a
rationale.
The effect of covenant theology was crucial to the
formation of the Puritan character. Our conventional picture of him as a man of tremendous faith and endurance^ and
the wherewithal to conquer a stubborn wilderness is quite
consonant with his theology. The typical Puritan was

'Richard Sibbes, cited by Miller, The New England
Mind. The Seventeenth Century, p< 377.
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intolerant of those without a driving sense of progress and
of empire building. "Faith, endurance^ intolerance:
these aggravated by Calvinistic theology, characterize the
Puritan frontier."~~ They characterize what Santayana
called the gospel of work and the belief in progress,
By subduing a wilderness and building a new social
order, the Puritans gave flesh and blood to the Covenant
of Grace. They opened the floodgates of experience with
their sense of a God who revealed His plan in and through
time. If the God of power was remote and utterly beyond
human understanding, then that same Lord, as a God of Love,
was discernible and stood in their midst. And while a God
of Love was still not discernible to the intellect completely, man is capable of making an aesthetic response to Him
in the New England forests. It was a Puritan who said:
The Scripture, that saith of God, that he is
Life and Light, saith also, that he is Love, and
Love is Complacence, and Complacence is Joy; and
to say God is Infinite, Essential Love and Joy,
is a better notion, than . • • to say,^hat God
• • < (is) but a Thought, or an Idea.
If a God of love evoked such a response as this, then
we must reconsider the traditional charge against the Puritans that they were deficient in a sense of beauty. Puritan
theologians rhapsodized the beauty of nature as evidence of

15Hazard, p. 27.
'Richard Baxter, "Epistle to the Reader," Poetical
Fragments (London: 1681), pp. 4-5. Cited in Perry, p. 378
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God's existence. They saw a Platonic world where beauty
was the efficient order and harmony of all things fixed
by God* John Preston defined beauty as "a conformity of
all parts," and Thomas Hooker said it was the "sweet correspondence and orderly usefulness the Lord first implanted
in the order of things.'"*"' Consider the eloquence of Preston
Can we, when we behold the stately theater of
heaven and earth, conclude other but that the
finger, arm, and wisdom of God hath been here,
although we see not him that is invisible, and
although we know not the time when he began to
build? Every creature in heaven and earth is a
loud preacher of this truth. Who set out those
candles, those torches of heaven, on the table?
• • • Who taught the birds to build their nests,
and the ^ees to set up and order their common-

wealth?!y

The Puritans had no sophisticated theory of beauty.
They simply saw God's image in the efficient order and
harmony of nature, and they constantly drew analogies between the beautiful objects of ordinary experience and
their perfect exemplar. God's beauty was especially seen
in the artifacts of Puritan handicraft,for, in their
struggle to survive, the axe and the rifle were vivid
examples of good, efficient order. They had little appreciation for the fine arts. These did not fit into a frontier economy as did the practical arts. And yet they did

not equate beauty with utility; beauty was still the
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Miller and Johnson, Vol. I, p, 62 <

•L8Miller, The New England Mind. The Seventeenth
Century, p. 210.

43
rightful order of all things. Thus, there was a dearth of
aesthetic appreciation among them. Professor Miller is quite
correct that "the Puritan aesthetics contributed to cosmic
,19

optimism."

We should be very surprised if such an optimism made
no room for science. The overwhelming concensus of scholars
is that the Puritans not only accepted the great scientific
advances of the Enlightenment, but encouraged them and even
made significant contributions •**v Scientific research was
seen as a marvelous verification that nature reflects the
wonder and beauty of God. In the middle of the seventeenth
century Harvard taught Copernican astronomy from a standard
textbook. By and large, European universities were forbidden
to teach it until the end of the century, but Harvard disseminated the new system with enthusiasm long before, and
the yearly almanac contained articles which popularized

19... ...

Miller, The New England Mind, p. 215. Cosmic optimism is his favorite term for describing the Puritan weltan—
schauung. He calls it "the indispensable premise of all
Puritan belief." p. 208.
2^In 1680, Thomas Brattle of Harvard made a series of
comet observations to which Newton gave acknowledgment.
"This study of the gravitational influence of the sun on the
moon and comets was the actual foundation and the beginning
of the writings of the immortal Principia." See Frederick E.
Brasch, "The Newtonian Epoch in the American Colonies (16801783), "Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society,

XLIX (1939), 314-332.
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it."* The New England Puritans rapidly assimilated the
work of Copernicus, Galileo, Gilbert, Boyle and Newton into
their theology. Without a doubt, Puritans on both sides of
the ocean were a part of the scientific community.

22

The tendency to contrast the humanism and enlightenment
of the scientific movement with a conventional caricature
of Puritanism as reactionary and obscurantist cannot be sustained by the evidence. "That Calvin and Puritanism had a
stimulating influence upon science has been made evident by

23

several recent studies.""*' Puritanism was an important

factor in developing the type of empirically -grounded thinking which would be conducive to scientific activity.
It is not enough to explain the Puritan's vigorous
pursuit of science by attributing it solely to their penchant for logic, as some writers suggest. In fact. Covenant
theology, because of its requisite tight logic, had trained
the mind to rigorous thinking , and when books of Newtonian
science arrived in the colony, their habit of systematic

21_

Zechariah Brigden, "A Brief Explication and proof
of the Philolaick Systeme," Almanack, Cambridge, 1659; reprinted in the New England Quarterly^ VII (1934), pp. 9-12.
'See R. Hooykaas, "Science and Reformation," The Evolution of Science, Guy S. Metraux and Francis Crouzet eds7
(New York: Mentor, 1963), p. 256.
23_.

Ibid., p. 289.
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thought allowed-them to digest the new physics.*" Thus,
while the former thesis is quite true, it fails to take into
account the Puritan aesthetic and their cosmic optimism,
Their receptiveness to Copernicus and Newton was as much
due to religious experience as to rigorous thinking. They
saw scientific research as an approach to the beauty of God
through the beauty of His creation; God made such matters
known by His will. Science permitted them to see nature as
the outward symbol of the inner life of God.
The employment of nature as symbol • • • was
for the Puritan mind much more important than the
choice of which particular system of physics was
used to explain nature. The universe was to be
studied and expounded because it was the providence of God in operation; the essential disposition to see God's hand in events, a perception of
the identity of natural order and divine decree,
an ability to read the analogy between spiritual
law and natural laws, and a faith in the f^pdamental perfection of the plan of creation,
The extent to which science and experience had made
an inroad into the Puritan mind is vividly illustrated in
Cotton Mather. This high priest of Puritanism recognized
the significance science held for religion, and wrote about
the wonder and beauty of nature with the feeling of a

'Frederick C. Kilgour, "The Rise of Scientific Activity in Colonial New England," Yale^Journal of Biology and
Medicine, XXII (1949), 138. See also Brasch^ p7-332^—-He
sees merely an intellectual assimilation of Newtonian science, giving rise to Puritan rationalism.
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'Miller, The New England MincL The Seventeenth
Century, p, 216.

^Sl!-"--

46
poet-mystic. In his book The Christian Philosopher, he
argues that the dazzling beauty of the world uncovered by
science bespeaks a benevolent God, and that to study nature
is to realize God's Goodness."" Of all the developments in
science, astronomy and the new knowledge gained through the
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telescope excited him the most.- Mather realized the telescope unveiled to man an infinite universe, and his rapture
is unmitigated.
I hear a great voice from the starry heavens,
ascribe ye greatness to our God. Great God, what
a variety of worlds hast thou created; How astonishing are the dimensions of them! How stupendous
are the displays of thy greatness, and of thy glory,
in the creatures, with which thou hast replenished
those worlds! Who can tell what angelic inhabitants
may there see and sing the praises of the Lord!
Who can tell for what uses, those marvellous globes
may be designed! Of these unknown worlds I know
thus^much,
it "
is""
our
great """
God"'""
that"""
has"""•made them
al^28"'"" "
"""•"•""
His exaltation confirms a religious-aesthetic response to
the infinite world of modern science. Other texts confirm
that God's glory is exhibited most clearly in such a world.29

"Selections from Cotton Mather, Kennefeh B« Murdock,
ed. (New York: Hafner, 1960), pp. 1-11.
2^The Christian Philosopher (Charlestown: Middlesex

Bookstore7 1815)/ pp. 21-22.
Mather, The Christian Philosopher, p. 24.
'See Theodore Hornberger, "The Date, the Source, and
the Significance of Cotton Mother's Interest in Sciencey"
American Literature VI (1935), 413-420.
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Mather was the first in a line of Puritan thinkers who saw
the urgency of rethinking their conception of the universe
in the light of science, and of rediscovering God within a
world whose physical dimensions were no longer confinable to
ordinary human concepts• Edwards followed in the eighteenth
century with the best attempt at this task of reconciling
religious belief with the demands of -science.
.The key to their conception of the universe had always
been the idea of providence, and science was a new way,
revealed by God's wisdom, of discovering it. In a universe
of countless unknown worlds, they realized the infinite
depth of his providence, and that God is not tied down to
one plan. He does not answer to a classical Greek world
governed by reason, measure, limit, and proportion.
And y,et this is a thoroughly moral world He has
created. The Puritans had to see religious and moral
truths written into it. This was the tension they lived
with: they felt compelled to lead a moral life, but they
could not say the same morality, where the full measure of
divine grace was observable, was binding on the universe.
They must strive for communication with the supreme force
which governs the world, but they knew better than to expect that force, in the Platonic sense, to conform always
to their conception of what is reasonable. They accommodated their lives to this tension, and out of it came a
cosmic optimism and their peculiar sense of beauty. They
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achieved a fusion of religion and experience far better than
the other Christians of their day. All the affairs of everyday life had religious significance. Faith in God was the
decisive factor which carried them through their perils.
It is here that we find a unique Puritan aesthetic.
There is more than one kind of beauty, and the
Puritan, like many other men in all ages, discovered in what he saw as the beauty of holiness
enough to satisfy all the cravings of his nature.
His life seems sterile to us. Perhaps it was so
in fact; perhaps we fail to appreciate hflts passionate was his conviction and how challenging
his ideal. While Puritanism was alive, with
power to make history, its morality and its
rules were developed.. from within as the fruit

of individual faith«^0

We may draw the following conclusions from our discussion of the effects of science and experience on Puritanism. First, they had a religious vision of God's providence operating in the universe and in the life of man,
More properly, it was a religious experience, for it
penetrated all levels of life. Second, this vision, or
experience, was founded on the Covenant of Grace which
implied a doctrine of history, and was enriched by seventeen th century science and by life in the New World. Third,
the most important, it was the aesthetic experience of a
moral universe, generated by the tension between what the
world ought to be and what it is in fact.

^Kenneth B. Murdock, "The Puritan Tradition in American Literature," The Reinterpretation of American Literature,
ed., Norman Foerster (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1928), p»
100.
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CHAPTER IV
OF BEAUTY AND SENSIBILITY IN EDWARDS'
DOCTRINE OF EXPERIENCE
One of the distinguishing features of Edwards' thought
is the way in which he organized if around a doctrine of
experience. Quite early in his life he began to adapt his
religious ideas to the requirements of Lockean empiricism,
but he also moved beyond Locke toward his own unique formulation of experience. So it is imperative to study this
doctrine in its origins and its development to demonstrate

that his mystical theology is grounded in experiential
categories. There are three elements, which, taken together,
form the heart of his doctrine of experience. First, there
is the idea of beauty , or excellence, which signifies Edwards' singular achievement as theologian and is basic to
his philosophy, especially to what is commonly called his
epistemological empiricism. Second, there is the element
in this empiricism which he designates as a sense of the
heart. It is a doctrine of knowledge in which affection
is put on an equal footing with reason in the noetic act
(process of cognition). Finally, there is the theological
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concept of grace, or love, which is the capstone of his
whole doctrine of experience. A thorough expUcation of
each of these components in themselves and in their interrelations will reveal the full meaning of experience for
Edwards,"

To begin with the first of these, the idea of beauty,
it is important to note that an intense awareness of the
aesthetic dimension in all things permeated his life* This
sense of beauty suffused his experience and came to form
the central insight of his religious and metaphysical
thought. Edwards was never more original than in the way
he demonstrated the connection between aesthetic and religious experience. This was not so much inferred from a
theological or philosophical premise as it was sensually felt

by him as though its were physically a part of his being.
He fashioned a novel system of thought in which the greatest
single influence was not any other system but an original
aeshtetic view of things. It dominated his mind and guided
the growth of his thought.
More than any one else of his time, Edwards perceived
the subtle changes that life in the wilderness and the revolution in science and philosophy exerted over the New England
Calvinist mind. He realized better than his adversaries the

'See: for an exhaustive analysis of this area alone,
Roland A. Delattre, Beauty and Sensibility in the Thought of
Jonathan Edwards (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
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profound significance of the Great Awakening, a popular

religious revival of the 1740*s which was precipitated by
the crisis within Puritanism. As a sociological phenomenon,
it marked the point at which the wilderness replaced traditional doctrine as the primary source of theological
2 ^

meaning." After the Great Awakening, experience prevailed
and assumed a major role in the development of philosophy
and theology in America.^ When it merged with the Christian
doctrine of providence, it gave rise to a philosophical and

theological empiricism that sought the mind of God in the
stream of human and natural history.4 Consequently, a cult
of experience sprang forth from this theological empiricism
and extended itself into the arts and literature where it

'See Miller, Errand Into the Wilderness, p. 153<
^Although there are great difficulties in the concept
of an "American theology," there is a validity to ascribing
to America an indigenous theological development. See
Daniel B. Williams, "Tradition and Experience in American
Theology," The Shaping of Religion in America, eds., James
Ward Smith, A. Leland Jamison (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1961).
'Williams, p. 473. "The most important root of the
theological empiricism was the belief, derived from the
Christian faith and present in the American consciousness
from the Puritans and Edwards to the present, that a sufficiently faithful and realistic attention to the direction
of historical events will disclose the hand and judgment of
God. American theological empiricism in all its forms has
an inward relation to the doctrine of Providence, whether
this be expressed in Calvinist determinism, in ideas of
progress, or in the criticism of progressive optimism."
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took the form of vernacular expression."

It was no accident of history that New England produced its outstanding genius, in whom its doctrine was
summed up and transformed, at that precise moment when
experience gained a position of dominance in shaping the
nascent institutions of American life. The rapid turn of
events in the first half of the eighteenth century, the
influences of the Enlightenment permeating Massachusetts,
resulted in two distinct developments in Puritanism, One
was the growth and spread of evangelical religion which moved
westward with the frontier, and the other was the rationalism
and deism that dominated the east, leading toward nineteenth
century Unitarianism. Edwards mediated these opposing tendencies by analyzing the Awakening, giving it a perspective^
and constructing an empirical theology which would withstand
assaults from both sides.
When we turn to his personal life, we find that from
the beginning his uncommon sensibilities and acute responsiveness prepared him for the task of overhauling traditional empiricism and aligning it with the cause of religion.
From Sereno Dwight we learn that "the refinement of manners
arid of character, which he witnesses in (his parents) and

'See John A, Kouwenhoven, Made in America. The Arts
in Modern Civilization (New York: Doubleday, 1948). Also,
two essays by Philip Rahv, "Paleface and Redskin," and "The
Cult of Experience in American Writing," Image and Idea (New
York: New Directions, 1957)<
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in their friends, prepared his own mind from his earliest
years, to withdraw from everything low and grovelling, and

to find a high enjoyment in all the varieties of intellectual
and moral beauty."v By nature and inheritance, he was gifted
with exceptional powers of observation and a love of beauty
which made him an artist. His life was given to the
pursuit of beauty in all things, and to the task of bringing
religion together with an empirical view of the world in
order to enrich the qulaity of all sensual experience.
"One characteristic • • • which he possessed in an unusual
degree, was a fondness, minutely and critically to investigate the works of nature. This propensity was not only discovered in youth and manhood, but was fully developed in his
childhood."' His "Personal Narrative," an autobiographical
account of his religious conversion, constantly reflects
this theme.
The books and sermons of Edwards indicate a man whose
faculties were attuned "to the beauties of nature in the air
and on the face of the earth." He was more than a keen
observer of nature; he was an artist who intuited the
infinite possibilities of nature because of its source in
an infinite God,

'The Life of President Edwards (1829), I, p. 19.
7Ibid., p. 22.
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The beauty of trees, plants, and flowers with
which God has bespangled the face of the Earth
is Delightsome, and the beautiful frame of the
body of Man, especially in its Perfection is
Astonishing, the beauty of the moon and stars,
is wonderful, the beauty of the highest heavens,
is transcendent, the Excellency of angels and the
saints in light, is very Glorious, but it is all
Deformity and Darkness in Comparison of the
higher glorigS and beauty of the Creator of
all • • • •

This text recalls the lively exultation of Cusa and the
exuberant joy of Bruno in their discovery of an abundantly
rich universe. Nowhere does Edwards sing more joyfully
about the opulence of nature than in The Beauty of the
World.

.

.

How lovely is the green of the face of the
earth in all manner of colours, in flowers,
the colour of the skies, and lovely tinctures
of morning and evening. • • < Hence, the. reason

why almost all men, and those that seem to be
very miserable, love life, because they cannot
bear to lose sight of such a beautiful and
lovely world. The ideas, that every moment
whilst we live- have a beauty that we take not
a distinct notice of, brings a pleasure that,
when we come to the trial, we had^rather live
in much pain in misery than lose.
Other similar texts appear frequently in his writings. They
show that in his descriptions of nature he never failed to
introduce the aesthetic element.
That Edwards had the temperament of an artist cannot

8_
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From an unpublished sermon quoted in Ola E. Winslow,
Jonathan Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 19413 , p. 139.
^Images or Shadows of Divine Things. ed« Perry Miller
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 136-137.
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be denied. Yet-we tend to overlook the powerful influence
his environment exerted over his temperament, He did rot
operate in an intellectual vacuum, and we cannot minimize
the circumstances of his life in a frontier society. His
sensitive eye for beauty always alerted him to the magnificence and charm found everywhere in nature. He responded
aesthetically to turbulent thunderstorms as well as to serene
sunsets. He especially found exceptional delight in the
magniture of the wilderness, and concluded that the mind
has a natural propensity to beauty in great objects. Large
rivers, large mountains, the great expanse of space experienced in the first western migration from Boston into
western Massachusetts and Connecticut; these were the kinds
of experience which enlarged Edwards* capacity to absorb a
new kind of beauty. "So the beauty of the solar system (is)
more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity
(than is to be found) in a tree."*" At the time in history
when Europe was discovering the aesthetic of the infinite,11
Edwards was giving it new expression in the American wilderness. He was no classicist who confined beauty to the
measurable, the limited, the rational, "He was no Latin,

'Quoted by A. C. McGiffert, Jonathan Edwards (New
York: Harper, 1932), p. 191.
'See Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and
Mountain Glory (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963).
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no Stoic -- he-was a Puritan, an American, and a barbari,12

an."*" So he rejoiced at a world replete with the infinite
goodness of a God; a goodness which is accessible to man in
immediate perception; a goodness and beauty too rich in all
its concreteness to be assimilated by intellect alone.
It was at a very early age that Edwards came to realize how inadequate the intellect is by itself as an instrument for confronting such a world. As a student at Yale,
he discovered that the primacy of experience in his own
life was far greater than he could ever imagine. In his
later years he recalled that the turning point in the growth
of his mind occurred upon reading Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. He called himself "a great miser"
gathering up "handfuls of silver and gold from some newly
discovered treasure" as he pored through Locke's thesis
that experience, and only experience can be the source of
our mental life. Perry Miller calls Edwards the frontier
disciple of Locke with the erroneous implication that the
Essay became the vade mecum of his entire philosophic
life. He did not follow Locke in any fundamental sense;
rather, Locke became a guide which aided him in his own
exploration of experience. If he was a greedy miser
counting the treasures of the Essay, he did net hoard these

12_

, Jonathan Edwards, p. 183.
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treasures, but evaluated them for their relevance to his
own situation. Locke's empiricism became a challenge to
construct a theory which would do justice to his own
wilderness experience, and not to Locke's,
After he had thoroughly read and absorbed the new
empiricism, Edwards sketched out his precocious essay,
"Notes on the Mind," which was a compendium of his entire
philosophical career. A great deal of it was written while
he was still a student, and it represents his formative work
It encompasses every major question to which he would devote
a lifetime of study. Edwards differed from other thinkers
of comparable stature because there was no substantial
change throughout his life from the system of thought outlined here at the beginning. He never deviated in any significant way from the principles he set down as a college
student, but spent his time amplifying and clarifying them,
The Lockean motivation behind these "Notes" is quite evident, but the work reflects another important influence
which cannot be attributed to Locke. One reads on every
page the subtle influence of his own personality, nurtured
by a religious-aesthetic experience of life on the western
frontier of the New England Plantation. If we can discern
the balance between both influences in this essay, then we
shall have an authentic and greater appreciation of the
foundation of his empiricism.
Throughout all his early works, which include the
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"Notes on Natural Science," and "Of Being" in addition to
"The Mind," Edwards consistently manifests an idealism.

13

On the question of the possible influence of Bishop Berkeley,

the evidence indicates a high improbability that Edwards had
access to his writings. There is a great tendency on the
part of scholars to conclude that he arrived at the same
conclusions as the Anglican bishop by an independent route.
The reduction of Locke's primary qualities to secondary
qualities was an easy step for him to take, since in all
these works he manifests an overriding concern for the
mysterious notion of consciousness. Every knowing philosopher, he tells us, agrees "that Colours are not really in
the things, no more than Pain is in a needle; but strictly
no where else but in the mind." By what right do we then
say that body has an independent existence? None, according to Edwards. For the idea of body is "nothing but
Colour, and Figure, which is the termination of this Colour,
together with some powers, such as the power of resisting,

'For critical comment on his idealism, these earlier
works are excellent sources to begin with: Egbert C. Smyth,
"Jonathan Edwards' Idealism," American Journal of Theology,
V (October, 1898), 950-64, Smyth works from early manuscripts, especially "Of Being." See also H. N. Gardiner,
"The Early Idealism of Jonathan Edwards," Philosophical Review, IX (November, 1900), 573-596. Concludes that the
inspiration came from Locke, Newton, and Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist. The article also suggests that "Edwards'
deepest spiritual affinity was not with Calvin, but with
Dante," John H. MacCracken, "The Sources of Jonathan Edwards'
Idealism/' Philosophical Review, XI (January, 1902), 26-42.
Believes that Edwards could not have been influenced by
Berkeley,
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and motion, etc-. • • • And if that which we principally
mean by the thing, itself, cannot be said to be in the thing
-I4

.....

.

.

itself, I think nothing can be." Nothing exists outside
the mind, then, except atoms, which by their nature consist
purely of solidity. "Any body • • were an atom, if it
were a perfect solid."" So body and solidity are the same;
and by solidity he means that which resists annihilation.
But the idea of resistance is associated with the ideas of
integrity and wholeness, and these have a relation to consciousness, specifically divine consciousness.""" Even atoms,

therefore, cannot really claim an existence independent of
mind.
Edwards' idealism rests on the principle that consciousness is intrinsic to being. Otherwise being becomes
meaningless. There is no sense to a being which is not
related to some form of consciousness. "We learn the
necessity of the Eternal Existence of an All-comprehending
.17

mind"" the moment we discover that the concept of nothing
is an empty and totally repugnant contradiction. It is a
contradiction and it puts the mind into convulsion and
confusion. There is a natural abhorrence to nothingness

14"Notes on the Mind," Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 668.
15"0f Being," Ibid., p. 711.
'For a full explanation of this point, see below, The
Theology of Atoms, Space and Gravity" in Chapter VIII.
17"The Mind," Works .(Dwight ed.) , I, p. 669.
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because the very matrix of being implies consciousness -is consciousness in the strict ontological sense.
How doth it grate upon the mind, to think that
something should be from all eternity, and yet
Nothing all the while be conscious of it. To
illustrate this: Let us suppose that the World
had a being from all eternity, and had many great
changes, and wonderful revolutions, and all the
while Nothing knew it, there was no knowledge
in the Universe of any such thing. How is it

possible to bring the mind to imagine this?
Yea, it is really impossible it should be, that
anything should exist, and Nothing has any existence but in consciousness: No, certainly, no
where else, bu1roGith(ar in created or uncreated
consciousness.

When Edwards says that the universe can exist only
in the divine mind, he makes of consciousness an irreducible
cosmic element. The individual's mind participates in cosmic consciousness to the extent that he forms some kind of
an awareness of totality and of the infinity of his own
consciousness. Edwards was keenly aware of the absence
of any boundaries to human consciousness. He knew that it
encompasses not only its immediate environment, but something much deeper. He knew this because his experience
of the boundless American landscape had given him a sense
of the limitless capacity of the mind to absorb this experience* As a young student in a frontier college he was
far ahead of most European thinkers in his intuition that
the great expanse of outer space (which was a daily reality

18

"Of Being," Ibid., p. 707.
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to him) meant an equally large expanse of human consciousness, -The youthful Edwards realized that the immensity of
space extends simultaneously in two directions: into the
outer cosmos and into the psychic space of man's inner
consciousness; and he saw that these are two dimensions
to the same fundamental reality which he linked with the
divine•
No fact was more evident to Edwards than that the
world reflects a universal consciousness and that everything stands in relation to an all-comprehending mind.
He never denied an objective reality, but he asserted that
the innermost nature of that reality was mental, and not
material in any sense that would totally exclude the
mental. An important consequence follows from his idealism. If the world exhibits such aesthetically pleasing
qualities as unity, equality and proportion, then their
source must be attributed to divine consciousness. This
means that the ideas man possesses of beauty must also be
attributed to this higher origin. Edwards' idealism
appears to be only a means toward another end, the end being a metaphysical account of the aesttetic structure of
reality."1'' In this account, ideas are energies or sources

19

A similar conclusion is arrived at by Lean Howard,
"Conclusion: The Mind of Jonathan Edwards," The Mind of
Jonathan Edwards, a Reconstructed Text (Berkeley and.Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 13334.
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of power which transform an otherwise pale, flaccid and
disparate world into a beautiful and dynamic cohesion. In
other words, the intrinsic relation of consciousness to
reality guarantees an aesthetic world; in Edwards' words,
a world of universal mutual consent.
We have in the fact of universal consciousness the
first principle of his doctrine of experience, because it
accounts for the aesthetic character of the world and
for man's ability to perceive it. But this fact must
be seen within a religious context^ for Edwards believed
strongly that the highest form of aesthetic experience is
religious in nature. When we perceive beauty in whatever
shape or form, it is really God's excellence that we are
perceiving according to our limited capacity. The first
distinguishing feature of all religious experience is the
aesthetic perception of divine beauty.
The point is best illustrated in his "Personal
Narrative," an autobiographical description of his own
conversion in which he depicts the aesthetic character of
religious experience. At the time of this conversion he
experienced a "kind of delight in religion." The first
instance of an "inward, sweet delight in God" occurred
when he read these words from Timothy:
Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible,
the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and
ever, Amen. As I read these words, there came

into my soul, and was as it were diffused through
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it, a sense of the glory of the Divine Being;
a new sense, quite different fran anything I
ever experienced before. • < • I thought with
myself, how excellent a Being that was, and

how happy I should be, if I might enjoy that
God, and be rapt up to him in heaven, and be
as it were swallowed up in him foreverl20
His Calvinism was no barrier to this delight. On the contrary, the very idea of sovereignty now "appeared exceedingly pleasant, bright and sweet," The idea of God's
sovereignty and majesty became curiously blended with a
sense of his meekness. No longer could Edwards aesthetically appreciate one without the other. He tells.of
walking alone in his father's pasture and contemplating
with a sweet sense, the "glorious majesty and grace of
God. ..."

I seemed to see them both in a sweet conjunction; majesty and meekness joined together;
it was a sweet, and gentle, and holy majesty;
and also a majestic meekness; an awful s^etness; a high, and great holy gentleness.
He then records the permanence and the depth of his
conversion. "After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had
more of that inward sweetness." Thereafter, the sense of
God's beauty suffused his being, and religion became the
one great source whereby experience took on a richness and
intensity never before possible.
'Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 60.
21_.

'Ibid., p. 61.
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The appearance of everything was altered; there
seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet, cast, or

appearance of divine glory, in almost everything.
God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love,
seemed to appear in everything; in the sun, moon,
and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the
grass, flowers, trees; in the water and all nature;
which used greatly to fix my mind. I often used to
sit and view the moon for a long time; and in the
day, spent much time in viewing the clouds and sky,
to behold the sweet glory of God in these things:
in the meantime, singing forth, with a low ^Qice my
contemplations of the Creator and Redeemer.
It became forcefully clear to Edwards that the pursuit
of beauty is not the proper undertaking of reason. "It is
not a thing that belongs to reason/' he said, "to see the
beauty and loveliness of spiritual things." Defining
reason as ratiocination^ or the power of inferring by
arguments, he never permitted an opportunity to pass without commenting on its inadequacy in the aesthetic and
religious life of man.
The perceiving of spiritual beauty and excellency
no more belongs to reason that it belongs to the
sense of feeling to perceive colours, or to the
power of seeing to perceive the sweetness of food.
It is out of reason's province to perceive the
beauty or loveliness of anything. • • . Reason's
work is to perceive truth and not excellency. • • •
Reason may determine that a countenance is beautiful to others, it may. determine that honey is
sweet to others; but it will^never give me a
perception of its sweetness.23
The primacy of experience in all things thus became
the ruling dictum of his philosophy. He asserted the general proposition "that experience is to be relied on," as

22Ibid.
VI,

'"A Divine and Supernatural Light," Works (Dwight ed.),
pp. 185-86. ~ ' —
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though it carried the persuasion of a self-evident truth.
"That the experience of mankind is to be depended on; or,
that those things which the world finds to be true by experience, are worthy to be judged true, is a general proposi.24 _

tion, of which none doubt." Reason itself dictates the
primacy of experience, for how unreasonable it is to say
that reason must first give credibility to the propositions
of experience. The sources of experience are indisputable
sources of truth. All the experience of mankind originates
with the testimony of the senses, of the memory, of other
men, and of history and tradition.
The fullest expression of the aesthetic nature of
religious experience is found in the Treatise Concerning
Religious Affections. Edwards describes the objective
source of the affections as a "transcendentally excellent
and amiable" God. It is unreasonable to think otherwise,
he states unequivocally, "than that (the) first foundation
of a true love to God, is that whereby he is in himself
lovely, or worthy to be loved, or the supreme loveliness
25 _

of his nature.""*' To say that God merits our worship
primarily because of his infinite beauty and not because
of his sovereignty is quite exceptional for a Calvinist.

"The Insufficiency of Reason as a Substitute for
Revelation," Works (Dwight ed.), VII, p. 263.
'Religious Affections, ed., John E. Smith (New Haven
Yale University Press, 1959), p. 242.
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God's nature • • • is infinitely excellent;
yea 'tis infinite beauty, brightness, and
glory itself.26
But then Edwards specifies the nature of infinite beauty
as a moral excellency.
That kind of excellency of the nature of divine
things, which is the first objective ground of ^
all holy affections, is their moral excellency.
Moral excellency, he tells us, is holiness, and in order to
behold it, man must acquire a new sense. Holiness, or spiritual beauty, requires a special aesthetic sense which is
also a moral sense* The implication here is that beauty
and moral excellency are identified in God, and that therefore beauty and morality have an identity in the experience
of regenerate man.

Edwards calls it a new spiritual taste, for it is
more than an intellectual awareness . It is a totally new
capacity for aesthetic and moral experience:
which is in its whole nature diverse from any
of the other five senses, and that something is
perceived by a true saint in the exercise of this
new sense of mind, in spiritual and divine things,
as entirely different from anything that is perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste
of honey is diverse from the ideas men get of
honey by looking on it or feeling of it; now this
that I have been speaking viz. the beauty of holiness in that thing in spiritual and divine things,
which is perceived by this spiritual sense, that
is so diverse from all that natural men perceive

in them: this kind of beauty is the quality that

Ibid., p. 243.
27Ibid., p. 256.
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is the immediate object of this spiritual
sense: this is the sweetness that is the
proper object of this spiritual taste.28
As one writer says, "No idea in all of Edwards' works is
more original."
What is conspicuously original is the way in which
Edwards subsumed the spiritual taste for divine excellency
under the broader category of moral experience. We learn
from a later work that morality is an irreducible category
of his metaphysics, that the end of all creation is the
moral world.
The last end for which God has made moral
agents, must be the last end for which God has
made all things; it being evident, that the
moral world is the end of the rest of the
world; the inanimate and unintelligent world
being made for the rational and moral world,
as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.30
Time and again, Edwards emphasized that the spiritual
sense has as its object the beauty of God's moral perfections. "What that beauty or loveliness of divine
things is, which is the proper and immediate object of
a spiritual sense of mind • • • is the beauty of their
moral perfections,""A The aesthetic experience of a man
28Ibid., pp. 259-60.
2<) John E« Smith, "Editor's Introduction, "Religious
Affections, p. 30.
30"A Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue," Works
(Worcester ed.) II, p. 412, See also. Religious Affections,
p. 273: "The glorifying of God's mo ral-per £ e ctions/ is~fche
special end of all the works of God's hands."
31_

"Religious Affections, p. 271.
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endowed with the spiritual sense of divine beauty is
equivalent to a moral experience. In this, Edwards
wishes to show. that the appreciation of beauty is not a
passive affair of beholding an objective order; but it
is an active moral response , a turning of the whole person towards God, and not merely an intellectual adequation to His objective existence.
The idea of excellency was undoubtedly the source
from which a great deal of his most original thinking
came. He first proposed a theory of aesthetics in "The
Mind," and he suggested that beauty in its highest form
be defined as the consent to being. Now the consent to
being is the pivotal concept in Edwards' moral philosophy;
and so as a precocious college senior he had already seen
the intrinsic connection between beauty and morality,
between aesthetic experience and moral experience,
Edwards' genius is manifest in the explication of
excellency written before he completed his course of study
at Yale, He was aware even then of its great importance
to his life and thought, for he indicated that it is "what
we are more concerned with, than anything else whatso..32

ever•""

He beings his probe into the nature of beauty by
repeating the classical formula: Excellency is harmony,

32"The Mind," Works (Dwight ed.) , I, p. 693.
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syrometry, or proportion. But of the three, proportion
would seem to be the most fundamental. Proportion, a
system of ratios, is further resolved into simple equality.
"Excellency therefore seems to consist in Equality• Thus,
if there be two perfect equal circles, or globes, together;
there is something more of beauty than if they were of
beauty of unequal, disproportionate magnitudes."
But this offers the lowest kind of aesthetic gratification; it is "Simple Beauty." When equalities proliferate
into complex patterns, the resulting "Complex Beauty"
offers a much more complete satisfaction to man's taste
for excellency. In "Simple Beauty" one part of component
of reality consents with but one other part. "But by
proportion one part may sweetly consent to ten thousand
different parts; all parts may consent with all the rest;
and not only so, but the parts, taken simply, may consent
with the whole taken together.

34

Edwards introduces the notion of relation as central
to the meaning of proportion. "All beauty consists in
35 _.

similarness or identity of relation.""*' The identity
or similarity of relations between different sets of
objects constitutes the innermost nature of beauty. As a
matter of fact, "one alone, without any reference to any
33Ibid., pp. 693-694.
34Ibid., p. 698.
35Ibid., p. 695.
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more, cannot be excellent; for in such case, there
can be, no manner of relation no way, and therefore
no such thing as Consent."*'" The absence of all

relations contravenes the whole idea of excellency
for Edwards, for this doctrine is rooted in a sense

of an organic world in which the individuality of
anything (and its beauty) is located in the sum of
its relations. When he says that without a plurality
there can be no excellency, he means the "various parts
of the Universe" are related so as to produce a
general consent or agreement.
The identity of relations occurs when parts of
bodies are the same as parts of other bodies. When
there are two bodies of different shapes in which there
is no similarity between their parts, then the result is
disproportion or deformity. But how does Edwards determine
when there is no similarity between the parts? His
answer marks the point at which he abandons the most
narrow and restricted meaning of geometric symmetry as
the criterion of beauty, and adopts a wider and more
flexible norm which would meet the requirements of expansive experience. He concedes that there are millions of
identities and similarities which make up a vast, limitless

36

Ibid.f p. 697.

L?8^^!S^S^S^?^-*'"^lfl'"?a^^lF?Sl^^?ar<^?3B[iS^''%^^'le^

71
network of relations, and that this calls for a new understanding of beauty. What we normally think of as "particular disproportions sometimes greatly add to general

37

beauty.""' Particular disproportions may not be disproportionate at all if they are seen as part of a wider
system. Edwards' aesthetic is reminiscent of the Stoics
and of St. Augustine here. He writes: "Excellency con—
sists in the Similarness of one being to another — not
merely Equality and Proportion, but any kind of Similarness."38

It is significant that Edwards' theory of aesthetics
in "The Mind" concludes by identifying beauty with the Consent to Being, by which he means the most generic trait
of all existence.
This is an universal definition of Excellency:
—The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's Consent
to Entity, The more the Consent is, and the more
extensive, the greater is the Excellency•^
Any further explication of beauty must therefore wait for a
more complete, later analysis of the meaning of consent.

37
Ibid,, p. 695.
38.

rlbid., p, 696. (Italics mine.)

39Ibid., p. 696.

CHAPTER V
THE SENSE OF THE HEART

The formative essays on "The Mind" and "Natural
Science" reveal how thorough was the influence of Locke
and Newton on the developing mind of Edwards. These early
works attest to the enthusiastic reception he gave to
physical science and to empirical philosophy. If he was
a person of unusual aesthetic and religious sensibilities,
these did not inhibit his capacity to absorb the latest
advances in scientific and philosophic thought. On the
contrary, these sensibilities allowed him to accept Locke
and Newton as the starting points of a new interpretation
of religion and philosophy in which an original doctrine
of experience was to become its rich and exciting
foundation-stone.

He called the foundation-stone a "sense of the heart,"
and he first gave it expression in the early pages of "The
Mind." The seat of man's cognitive life is situated in
the affections,or the heart, he tells us.
The Soul man • . • he said to be in the Heart,
or the Affections, for its immediate operations
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are there also. Hence we learn the propriety
of the Scriptures calling the soul, the Heart,
when considered., with respect to the Will and
the Affections.^
It follows that consciousness is a form of feeling. "It
is a sort of feeling within itself. The mind feels when
it thinks; so it feels when it discerns, feels when it

2

loves, and feels when it hates."'

He was no disciple of Locke in any fundamental way.
The originality of his version of empiricism likes in
the un-Lockean way in which he conceived the idea as a unit
of feeling, indeed the basic unit. The notion that the
higher activity of intellectual cognition is really a
species, however refined and abstract, of the elemental
affections is quite extraordinary, and cannot be attributed
entirely to Locke or to any other written source. It makes
much more sense to see it as a native personal trait, and
to see Locke's empiricism as the touchstone, or as a way
of articulating and structuring the doctrine. Edwards
understood cognition to be a complex and subtle expression
of feeling and he sustained an intricate system of metaphysics on this doctrine.
If we are permitted to call Edwards an empiricist
in the loose descriptive sense of the word, then his great

l"The Mind," Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 679.

2

Ibid., p. 680.
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achievement was the construction of a metaphysical
theology out of a perception of the visible world.
Locke had opened up for him a "vision of the universe

3

organized about the act of perception."" But Locke
could not have characterized that vision as an affective
response to a beautiful world. He could not have shown
Edwards that the perceptive center of man is rooted in
the heart; that one really experiences with the heart.
This was learned from the wilderness of Northampton and

Stockbridge* It taught him the futility of trying to
reduce it to a set of permanent abstractions. He saw
that experience resulted from a constant collision of
man with his environment, and that the environment did
not passively conform to the wishes and demands of man.
In the struggle to survive on the frontier, he saw that
the environment responded to his demands with a fierce
resistance. All the categories which generate experience were present: primitiveness, conflict, struggle,
resistance. And Edwards responded with a deep mystical
Joy.
The Essay had given him a blueprint for probing this
mysterious world, but it lacked a doctrine which would be
equal to the richness of his experience; in a word it

'Miller, "Editor's Introduction," Images or Shadows
Of Divine Things, p. 19.
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lacked the sense of the heart, Locke helped him to see
that the mind is really con joined with things; that man
is immersed in nature, and that mind and object, man and
nature, form an inseparable unity. But Locke's "ideas"
were discrete pellets of experience, and they failed to
uncover an organic world which was for Edwards a daily
reality. What was lacking in Locke was an appreciation
of knowledge as an affective relation to that world.
A sense of the heart belies any mechanistic philosophy that would confine the operation of nature to the
strictly defined laws of physics and mathematics. Edwards
appreciated Newtonian physics for he saw in it a concatenated universe which existed in space and time. But he
also saw that physics must be placed into a wider context
in order that mechanism be absorbed into a more complete
organic scheme. It was his intention, therefore, to show
how the sense of the heart introduces one to the wider
world of organic totality.
An organic view of the world was fundamental to
Edwards, and he summed it up in his doctrine of the
4

_.

.

consent to being. It is certainly implicit in his conception of excellency as a web of relations. The sense
of the heart enables a man to participate experientially
and affectively in this organic web of relationships or

4

This will be discussed in a later chapter,

76
mutual consents. Edwards calls love the center of experience, the highest kind of excellency; and he says that all
other relationships of harmony in the universe are images
of this exemplaristic consent between spiritual beings.
One of the highest excellencies is Love. As
nothing else has a proper being but Spirit, and
as Bodies are but the shadow of being, therefore
the consent of bodies one to another, and the
harmony that is among them, is but the Shadow of
Excellency. The highest excellency must therefore
be the consent of Spirits one to another. And the
sweet harmony between the various parts ofpthe
Universe, is only an image of mutual love.
Therefore, the harmonies and consents on lower levels of
being reflect the love which is peculiar to God and men.
Things are finite images of the infinite love communicated
by God to the world; and so every creature is implicated in
divinity in a fundamental way. With a sense of the heart,
a man perceives the correspondence of love between creator
and creature on all levels .
While the rudiments of Edwards' sense of the heart
(or affective epistemology as it may be called) are outlines in "The Mind," the doctrine is fully developed in
later writings." It rests upon his interpretation of

5"The Mind," Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 697.
6"Miscellanies" #782, published by Miller, "Jonathan
Edwards on the Sense of the Heart," Harvard Theological Review, XLI (April, 1948), 123-145. This-Ttem-Is also pub lished in Tovmsend, The Philosophy of Janathaa Edwards From
His Private Notebooks, pp. 113-12~6. OtTier—sources of mater-

ial are: Religious Affections (Smith ed.), pp. 272-273;
and an unpublished manuscript in the Yale Collection,
"Miscellanies" #1183.
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Locke's conception of an idea. For both Locke and Edwards,
the "simple idea" is the basic component of thought. The
word stands as a generic term for any unit of perception,
and Edwards concurs with the Essay on this point. Idea
stands for "whatever is the object of the understanding,"
and is used "to express whatever is meant by phantasm,
notion, species or whatever it is which the mind can be
employed about in thinking,"' Simple ideas originate
in immediate experience and are the irreducible units
of knowledge. A number of them may be formed into complex
ideas, or "mixed modes," by organizing them into various combinations. The essential difference between them is in
their respective origins. Simple ideas originate in perception and complex ideas originate only within the mind.
The distinction is an important one, for only the
simple idea is directly connected with a sensation; and
Edwards realized the danger of confusing it with a mixed
mode which does not correspond directly to any sensation.
A further confusion arises in the relationship between
thought and language. Simple ideas and mixed modes are
capable of being expressed by words, Locke discovered in
Book III of the Essay. Words can stand in place of ideas
and function much in the same way as the ideas • A great

"Essay Concerning Human Understanding," The English
Philosophers From Bacon to Mill, E. A. Burtt ed7-(New^Ydrk:
Random House, 1939), p. 247.
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deal of our thinking is carried on by the use of "abstract"
words rather than "concrete" ideas• The mental word replaces the sensation and serves as a method of mental shorthand in order to expedite the process of thought. "We
thus, in the discourse of our minds, generally make use
of signs instead of ideas."w
There is very often no actual idea of those
things when we are said to think of them . • •
the thought is not employed about things themselves immediately, or immediately exercised in
the idea itself, but only some sign that the
mind habitually substitutes in the room of the
idea.9
In standing in the place of an idea, a word can be
the source of sensation; it can generate or excite an experience. But a great deal of caution must be exercised,
Edwards warns us, because mixed modes are abstract ideas
and do not pertain to any immediate sensation. So the
word which stands in place of the mixed mode is not
properly capable of generating a sensation.
When we, inthe course of our thoughts • < ,
think of any sort of substance or distinct
beings, as particularly of men, instead of
going about with attention of mind actually
to excite the idea of those things that belong
to the nature of man, that are essential to
it • • . and so having actually such an abstract idea as Mr. Locke speaks of, we,have
only an idea of something in our mind,10

"Miscellanies" #782, The Philosophy of Jonathan
Edwards From His Private No tebboK s, p. 115.
9Ibid., p. 114.
lolbid., p. 115. (Italics mine.)
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Those are what "Mr. Locke calls 'mixed modes,'" and they
are to be rigorously distinguished from the units of sensation called simple ideas,
At this juncture in his analysis Edwards departs
from Locke and makes the identification of an idea with
its sensation so complete so as to redefine the idea as
a species of affection. "To have an actual idea of any
pleasure or delight, there must be excited a degree of that
delight; so to have an actual idea of any trouble or kind
of pain, there must be excited a degree of that affection"-- The essential meaning of the sense of the
heart, of Edwards' empiricism, is summed up here.
In order to clarify further the meaning of this
doctrine, he offers a distinction between two general
ways of understanding or thinking: cogitation, which is
the indirect grasping of reality through signs; and
apprehension, the "direct ideal view" of reality. Moreover, there are two faculties whereby direct apprehension
occurs. First, there is the understanding, "or what is
figuratively called the head," and includes the modes of
discerning, judging, or speculating. It is essentially
characterized as a passive, detached way of understanding,
void of any sense or taste of that which it is grasping.

11
Ibid.
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There is a second way of apprehending which Edwards
denotes as the will, "or what is figuratively called the
heart," The head and the heart, the understanding and the
will, are not essentially opposed whereby one performs the
thinking and the other performs the choosing. They are both
modes of apprehension, but while the understanding is a speculative mode, the will is an experiential mode. It apprehends on a sensible level whereby things are pleasing or
displeasing,
including all agreeableness and disagreeableness, all beauty and deformity, all pleasure
and pain, and all those sensations, exercises,
and passions of the mind that arise from either
of those. An ideal apprehension or view of
things of this latter sort is what is vulgarly
called having a sense* 'Tis commonly said, when
a person has an ideal view of anything^of this-^
nature, that he has a sense of it in his mind.
The contrast between understanding and will is
really a contrast between notional understanding (i«e«
knowledge by signs), and direct sensible knowledge, which
is by "some feeling of the heart."^^ In the case of
notional understanding there is no "ideal apprehension"

12Ibid., p. 119.
'In the Religious Affections, p. 272, Edwards distinguishes the speculative faculty from "the sense of the
heart, wherein the mind don't only speculate and behold,
but relishes and feels. . • • The soul (is) a being that
not only beholds, but has inclination, and is pleased or
displeased. And yet there is the nature of instruction
in it; as he that has perceived the sweet taste of honey,
knows much more about it, than he who has only looked upon
and felt of it."
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for this involves sensible knowledge. "An ideal apprehension • • • is, in vulgar speech, called an having a
14

_

....

..

_.

sense of things."*' But it is not perception in the popular sense, as restricted to the so-called five senses; it
involves intellect and the whole register of human emotions.
It means human experience of delight, beauty, comfort, pain,
misery, hope, fear, loving, hating, etc*, and not merely the
perception of colors and sounds.
Edwards specifies within the sense of the heart two
levels of sensible knowledge which are called natural and
supernatural. There is a purely natural type of experience that men are capable of by which they have a sense
of the "objects that are about them" through the laws
operating in nature. There is also a natural sense of
beauty "as when the ear hears a variety of sounds harmoni,15

ously proportioned."~~ But there is in addition a kind
of supernatural sensibility which is clearly superior,
and it depends on "some immediate influence of the Spirit
of God." It involves "a sense of spiritual and eternal
things, or things that appertain to the business of reli.16

_.

gion and our eternal interest."~ Such a sense is beyond

'The Philosophy of Jonathan E^ a: Is From His Private
Notebooks, p. 120.
"Ibid., p. 121.

16

Ibid., p. 122.
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the range of man's natural capacity (the best that can be
achieved on this level is a speculative knowledge)• It
requires the intervening influence of God to infuse a concrete sense or feeling of these things.
But this distribution of sensible knowledge into
natural and supernatural is reinforced by the distribution
of the objective order of nature into "natural good or
evil" and "spiritual good or evil."
By spiritual good I mean all true moral good,
all real moral beauty and excellency, and all
those acts of the will or that sense of the heart
that relates to it and the idea of which involves
it, and all sense of it, all relish and desire of
it and delight in it, happiness consisting in it,
etc. By natural good and evil I mean all that
good or evil which is agreeable or disagreeable
to human nature as such , without regard to the
moral disposition—as all natural beauty and
deformity such as a visible, sensible proportion.^
or dispropqrtion in figures, sounds, and colors.
Natural me]ci (i.e. unregenerate men) have only an inchoate
sense of spiritual good and evil. "They have very little
of any ideal apprehension of any sort of divine and
eternal things.""" Whatever sensible knowledge they do
have is of natural good and evil, and this requires a
divine assistance or what Edwards calls in another context the "common grace" of God.

19

But in order to have the full experience of spiritual
Ibid., p. 122. (Italics mine)
18Ibid., p. 123.
3-^See "Treatise on Grace," Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan Edwards of/ America/ ed. Alexander
B. urosart lEclinGurgn: Pnntect tor private circulation, 1865)
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good which he designates as "all real moral beauty," a
man must be infused with a supernatural principle. There
is no other source of this experience than the excellency
of God; it arises as the "sensible apprehension of the
spiritual excellency of divine things." Therefore, the
direct experience of God's beauty is the sole source of
the conviction of its truth. Edwards is unequivocal
in emphasizing this point.
An ideal and sensible apprehension of the

spiritual excellency of divine things is (the)
proper source of all spiritual conviction of
the truth of divine things. . • ^There can be
no saving conviction without it.20
This conviction, however, is not entirely independent of
experience in the natural order. The sense of divine
excellency
also partly depends on a sensible knowledge
of what is. natural in religion--as this may be
needful to prepare the mind for a sense of its
spiritual excellency and, as such, a sense of
its excellency may depend upon it. For as the
spiritual excellency of the things of religion
itself does depend on and presuppose those
things that are natural in religion, they being
as it were, the substratum of this spiritual
excellency, so a sense or ideal apprehension
of the one depends in some c}?asure on the ideal
apprehension of the other.

"The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
Notebooks, p. 125.
2^Ibid., In his sermon on "A Divine and Supernatural
Light," Edwards says that the natural faculties are used by
God. "They are the subject of this light: and in such a
manner, that they are not merely passive, but active in it.
God; in letting in this light into the soul, deals with man
according to his nature." Works (Dwight ed.), VI, p. 179.
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The spiritual sense of God's moral excellency, therefore,
has a foundation in the natural order and the natural
sensibility of man. This is of decisive importance to the
sense of the heart. Man can only experience the real moral
beauty of God if the Spirit stands within him and infuses
his sensibiLity. But the Spirit can stand within him only
if the substratum of nature and natural experience first
be present. The orders of grace and nature are thus joined
in the sense of the heart. God does not impart his excellency to man apart from natural experience but works
through and elevates man's natural capacity .for grasping
this excellency.
The sense of the heart represents the unique achievement of Edwards' epistemological doctrine, for it widens
experience considerably beyond the atomistic sensations
of Locke. In restoring experience to a position of primacy
in the cognitive process, he saw that man is immersed in
nature infinitely more than Locke could have ever imagined.
With the sense of the heart, a man has access to the richness of experience far beyond any conception of Locke.
The distinction between understanding and will,
speculative and sensible knowledge, serves a most important
function in this doctrine. It is quite accurate to call

22

it "the very core of his mature philosophy,"*'" In our
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'Harvey G. Townsend, "The Will and the Understanding
in the. Philosophy of_Jonathan Edwards," Church History, XVI
TDecember^i94^)^ 210^20 <:w;^" "—-—r
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modern idiom we would call it a distinction between judgment of fact and judgment of value, i.e», assertions about
the objective order and assertions about subjective
feelings.
It is the function of the understanding or the "head"
to discern the presence of an outward objective order of
fact, of a universal and transcendent reality. On the
other hand, it is the function of inclination or the
"heart" to judge of the subjective aspects of that
reality. There is "that in the objects of our knowledge
on the account of which they are worthy to be known, vis• ,
their relation to our wills and affection and interest."

23

In other words, there is an inherent setof properties in
objective reality which relates immediately to human life.
We attach value to these properties by judging them to be
good or evil, and man's mind is governed in all its thoughts
by them.
The will, in all its determinations whatsoever is governed by its thoughts and apprehensions of things with regard to those properties
of the objects of its thought wherein the degre<
of the sense of the heart has a main influence.""
In a pair of important sermons Edwards identifies
the objective and subjective orders as the "Objective and

23_. _..

'The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
Notebooks, p. 121. (Italics mine.)

24Ibid.
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Inherent Goods."25 The object of all true knowledge,
whether of the head or of the hearty is moral excellency,
specifically the moral excellency of God. But God has made
the human mind capable of a two-fold k-nowledge of his
transcendent goodness. "The first (is) that which is
merely notional; as when a person only speculatively judges
that any thing is, which. • • • is called good or excellent,
viz. that which is most to general advantage." This is
the Objective Good as it is beheld by the speculative
faculty. The second kind of knowledge is "that which consists in the sense of the heart; as when the heart is
sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence of the
idea" of God's goodness."" Thus the Inherent Good is a
"kind of participation of" the excellency of God,
Our direct and immediate experience of God is
a moral experience of his excellency, and we acquire it
with the sense of the heart. It is wrong to think of
some prior experience of God's being to which we subsequently attribute moral qualities. There can be no such
distinction. Edwards argues clearly that no such priority
can be put on existence over excellency.

25-

'See "God Glorified in Man's Dependence," Works
(Dwight ed.), VII, p. 156. (Preached in Boston in 1731);
and its sequel, "A Divine and Supernatural Light," Works
(Dwight ed.), VI, pp. 176-177. (Preached in New Haven in

1733) •
26Works, VI, pp. 176-77.
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Some have objected against a spiritual sight of
divine things in their glorious, excellent, and
divine form, as being the foundation of a conviction of the truth or real existence of 'em --

because, say they, the existence of things is in
the order of nature before^EoiTns or qualities of
them, as excellent or odious. And so the knowl-

edge of their existence must go before the sight
of their form of quality. They must be known to be
before they are seen to be excelTent. I answer, it
is true, things must be known to be before they are
known to be excellent, if by this proposition this
be understood: that things must be known really to
exist before they can be known really to exist excellent (ly) or really to exist with such and such
a beauty. . . « But if thereby be intended that
things must be known to have a real existence before the person has a clear understanding, idea,
or apprehension of the thing proposed or objected
to his view, as it is in its qualities either
odious or beautiful, then the assertion is not
true. For his having a clear idea of something
proposed to his understanding or view as very
beautiful or very odious . • • does not suppose
its reality; that is, it does not presuppose it,
though its real existence may perhaps follow from
it. But in our way of understanding things in
general, of all kinds, we first have some understanding or view of the thing j^n its qualities^
before we know. its existence,"'

The identification of the inherent and objective
orders in experience has this important consequence: it
means that a strict difference can no longer be maintained
between the order of fact and the order of value. Edwards
anticipated in many ways Kant's problem of a noumenal
world of objective fact beyond the phenomenal world of
appearance. For Kant, the categories of the understanding
extend only to phenomena, and beyond this lies the noumenal

27"Miscellanies" #1090, The Philosophy of Jonathan
Edwards from his Private Notebooks, pp. 251-52, (Italics
mine.)
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order and all the questions of religion and morality which
the understanding cannot reach. The result was the separation of facts and values, for the two reside in essentially
different orders. Values have their existence in the noumenal world of freedom. Consequently they cannot be derived
in any fashion from the phenomenal world of experience.
Edwards had no such problem, however, for the sense of the
heart is itself a type of spiritual understanding. Every
fact experienced is a value experienced; the Objective
Good and the Inherent Good are con joined. The Inherent
Good is the transcendent goodness and moral excellency
of God as it is possessed experientially by regenerate man.
Herein lies the true meaning of the sense of the
heart. It is a type of sensible knowledge which puts the
two orders of facts and values together by allowing man
to experience the world of fact as a communication of the
supreme moral excellency of God. It enables the spiritually
enlightened person to assimilate an alien world of impersonal and disparate facts into a cohesive moral and aesthetic
experience.

But only the regenerate man , the person infused with
Spiritual Light, is capable of such knowledge. Time and
again Edwards informs us of the fact that grace is a vital
element in the sense of the heart. His doctrine of experience is made complete by it, and so we must now turn our
full attention to its explication.

CHAPTER VI
GRACE AND EXPERIENCE

In discussing the philosophical import of grace, we
must remember that for Edwards theological categories had
a far greater extension and applicability throughout experience than we in the twentieth century would imagine.
Theological language was his specific medium for
philosophizing and for articulating the doctrine of
experience. His utterances had meaning beyond the
limits of formal theology, and this was equally true of
other Puritan divines of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. That age may be described as a time when a
profound sense of experience sought to express itself
through a modified Calvinist structure." Theological

•j-See John J. McDermott, "The American Angle of Vision
—II" Cross Currents, XV (Winter, 1965), 437-56. "In the
American seventeenth century, philosophy was all but nonexistent; yet reflection was intense and self-conscious,
primarily as a response to a pressing and omnipresent collective experience of a situation that was novel at every
turn. And although that period in American history offered
no articulation of the notion of experience as such, there
was a correspondingly rich awareness of the significance of
this situation over against the tradition of reflection. It
was a period that dealt with profound philosophical themes
without an articulated philosophical language."
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language functioned as the symbolic medium through which
experience became articulated and expanded. When it came
time for the Puritans to fashion a theory of knowledge out
of their rich sense of experience, they grafted their discoveries on to a set of religious symbols of which grace
was the most important.
It can be said that the notion of grace rounds out
and completes Edwards' doctrine of experience for a number
of reasons. It is, first of all, the indispensable principle of all genuine human experience, or "ideal understanding" as he would call it» Grace is the catalytic
agent within the heart which elevates the whole individual,
body as well as soul, to a regenerated life and a new sense
of the divine presence in reality. Moreover, it gives to
the religious dimension of life a uniqueness and an independence whereby man is genuinely put into touch with the
supernatural aspect of reality. In our exposition of the
meaning of experience thus far, it might be inferred mistakenly that for Edwards the sense of the heart is no more
than the awareness of moral excellency, and that religion is
reducible to an aesthetic-moral experience of a natural
kind. But he did not seek to reduce religion to morality
or to obscure in any way the uniquely religious aspect of
human life. He sough't to reverse this tendency and to elevate the source of all moral and aesthetic experience
beyond the boundaries of nature. Thus, the first sign
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by which the authenticity of such an experience may be
established is that it arises "from those influences • • •
which are spiritual, supernatural, and divine."" It was
Edwards' explicit intention to preserve in human experience what might be called the distinctively religious
element by which man becomes aware of his relationship
to a wider order of reality. He achieved this by defining
grace as a principle of experience or a "new simple idea"

3

in the sense that Locke had used the term idea--as the basic
unit of experience.
Grace is a multi-faceted doctrine for Edwards. It
can mean the presence of God within man as the intrinsic
source of his experience of moral excellency; and in
another sense it can mean the objective middle term, or
medium, through which the natural and the supernatural
achieve continuity. To be more specific about this
second point, grace enables the spiritually enlightened
person to make an identification between judgments of
fact and judgments of value because it allows him to see

'Religious Affections, p, 197.
'Ibid., p. 205. It is quite evident to Edwards that
grace is entirely above nature in its source and operation:
"Gracious affections are from those infbences that are supernatural." It follows that there is a corresponding
change in a man's nature: "There is a new inward perception pr sensation. ... If God produces something new in a
mind, that it a perceiving, thinking, conscious thing; then
doubtless something entirely new is felt, or perceived, or
thought. • • • There is what some metaphysicians call a new
simple ideji." (Italics mine.)
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that the Inherent Good participates in the Objective Good.
Only tl^e gracious person is capable of this, for in the
final analysis Edwards marks grace as Divine Love and the
individual's participation in it; and .love is the act of
joining together what appears to be essentially dissimilar
in our experience—the order of facts and the order of values.
What is more immediately to the point for Edwards is
that by making grace an essential principle of experience
he demonstrates the inadequacy of sensational psychology
and the mechanical view implicit in it to explain the world
and our experience of it. The purpose of science is to make
strict statements of objective fact, but the full meaning
of these statements can be comprehended only when they are
absorbed into the wider order of value judgments. But the
ability to assimilate scientific fact in this way depends
upon the agency of grace*
One of Edwards' deepest insights is into the nature
of grace as a transforming principle of experience in the
absence of which the truly human character of experience is
unattainable. He discovered that to call experience human
in the fullest sense means that it is an integral awareness
in which both the understanding and the will closely cooperate in eliciting the value orientation from every judgment of fact.
Grace, therefore, is the indwelling of the Holy
Spirit as the vital principle of a newly created nature.
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It enables one to experience or to taste the excellency
of Godl>s moral nature as it manifests itself throughout
the various levels of creation-—physical, moral, and
spiritual. Such a sense of divine moral excellency is
most properly called love, so that "true saving grace is
no other than that very love of God,"" There are three
elements in this description which can be distinguished
for further analysis. First, there is the idea of a new
principle of nature within man. Second, grace is a taste,
for, or a sense of moral excellency. Third, it is specifically designated as love.
In calling grace an "indwelling principle" within a
man's heart and "not an accidental union" with it,
Edwards wishes to stress three points. The first is
that it originates from a source entirely outside of
man and beyond nature. Thus,
The exercises and operations of this Spirit
are after the manner of a natural principle
in many respects, but yet there is that in it
that shews it . • • to be something supernatural not only in such a sense as to be a
principle besides all the principles of human
nature §s such, but also so as to be above all
nature."

In a corollary to this text he adds this comment: "Grace
is-a supernatural thing" in the sense that it is "from the

'Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan
Edwards of America, p. 53.
5"Miscellanies" No,, 818. Yale University Library
Collection. (Quoted by permission.)
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supernatural and immediate operation of the spirit."
Further evidence of this can be found in the important
sermon on "A Divine and Supernatural Light" in which God
is stated to be the source of all knowledge and understanding whatsoever. He is the author of the "secular"
knowledge men have of human arts and sciences, but only
in an intermediate and secondary way, for men are of
themselves capable of imparting such knowledge. But
of spiritual knowledge, or grace, "God is the author
• • • and none else: He reveals it, and flesh and
blood reveals it not. He imparts this knowledge
immediately, not making use of any intermediate natural
causes."

The second point of grace as an indwelling principle is that it creates a new nature. The infusion
of grace is the complete conversion of a soul and
hence a new creation of God, He does not merely perfeet that which previously existed, but he creates an
entirely new mode of experience. Edwards compares it
to a resurrection. Wicked men are said to be dead and
brought to life through the influx of grace. But
there is no middle ground between life and death.
Citing Scripture in behalf of this argument, he notes
that God "is represented as being • • • so united to
the faculties of the soul that he becomes there a

Works (Dwight ed.), VI, p. 172.
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.7

principle or spring of new nature and life<" In other
words,- God (especially in the person of Christ) abides
in the soul and illumines it from within, not without.
Grace is intrinsic to the nature of the saint, so that
the divine light emanates from the soul as sunlight
emanates from the sun. The light of grace is not merely
a reflected light but an original emanation of a "lightsome" body•

Third, grace is no transitory principle but a
permanent source of action within the soul. Thus, "the
Spirit of God is given to the true saints to dwell in

g

them, as his proper lasting abode."~ The Scriptures
represent spiritual conversion as a transformation of
nature, by speaking of being born again, and putting
off the old man, etc. The hallmark of such a conversion
is its permanence. If the virtuous action of a person
is sporadic and inconsistent, then there is no certain
sign of the presence of grace. The truly converted
person manifests a constancy of nature. "God gives his
Spirit to be united to the faculties of the soul, and
to dwell there after the manner of a principle of nature;
so that the soul, in being imbued with grace,, is imbued
with a new nature: but nature is an abiding thing."

9

7Religious Affections, p, 200. (Italics mine.)

8Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 342. (Italics mine.)
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The second element inEdwards' definition of grace is
that it is a new sense or taste of God's moral beauty,
"He that is spiritually enlightened truly apprehends
and sees it, or has a sense of it. He does not merely
rationally believe that God is glorious, but he has a sense
of the gloriousness of God in his heart."*" Grace is
nothing less than the principle of a new sense of experience whereby the soul is capable of embracing the divine
beauty as it is embodied in nature. The divine light
gives rise to an aesthetic experience the intensity of
which far exceeds any natural sense of beauty.
The first effect that is produced in the
soul, whereby it is carried above what it has
or can have by nature, is to relish or taste
the sweetness of the Divine relation. • . •

The first effect of the power of God in the
heart in REGENERATION, is to give the heart a
Divine taste or sense? to cause it to have a
relish of the loveliness and sweetness of. ithe
supreme excellency of the Divine nature.
The effect of grace is to elevate a person's experience
of himself and of his world to an entirely new level of joy
and happiness:
This knowledge is . • • sweet and joyful. Men
have a great deal of pleasure in human knowledge,
in studies of natural things; but this is nothing

to that joy which arises from this divine light
shining into the soul. This light gives a view
of those things that are immensely the most

loWorks (Dwight ed.), VI, p. 176.
^Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan
Edwards of America, p. 53.
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exquisitely beautiful, and capable of delighting
the eye of the understanding. This spiritual

light is the dawning of the light of glory in
the heart. There is nothing so powerful as this
to support persons in affliction, and to give
the mind pe^e and brightness in this stormy and
dark world.J-^

However, this divine spiritual taste "which is in its whole
nature diverse from any former kinds of sensation'""" is
not without an intellectual content. No concept is more
central to Edwards' doctrine of grace than what he calls
"spiritual understanding." To speak of a taste or sense
is to imply also that the soul is capable of an intellectual apprehension, a new kind of knowledge. "Holy affections
are not heat without light; but evercnore arise from some
information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge."14
Edwards is careful to strike a delicate balance
between inclination and cognition in his explanation of
grace, the same balance that we find in his explanation
of the sense of the heart. Indeed, he identifies the
spiritual understanding with the.sense of the heart, so
that intellect and will are seen to be in the closest
possible working cooperation to produce a genuine human

12Works (Dwight ed.), VI, p. 187.
13 Religious Affections, p. 259.
14Ibid., p. 266.
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experience of God's .excellency.
Spiritual understanding consists primarily
in-a sense of the heart; for it is not speculatipn merely that is concerned in this kind of
understanding: nor can there be a clear distinction made between the two faculties of understanding and will, as acting distinctly and
separately, in this matter. When the mind is
sensible of the sweet beauty and amiableness of
a thing, that implies a sensibleness of sweetness
and delight in the presence of the idea of it:
and this sensibleness of the amiableness or
delightfulness of beauty, carries in the very
nature of it, the sense of the heart; or an effect
and impression the soul is the subject of, as a
subst^pce possessed of taste, inclination and
will.1:}
Grace causes the spiritually enlightened person to experience in an entirely new way through the coordinated activity
of intellect and will. "It as it were opens a new world to
its view,"*" -- a world in which the glory of God and of
his works are manifest to man,
In the above text Edwards raises a crucial question
concerning the spiritual understanding, the question of the
relationship between the understanding and the will. He
asserts that the opposition between these "faculties"
cannot be permanent, but only functional, for they are two
aspects of what he calls inclination -- the basic orientation or direction of the soul. The difference between
understanding and will is the difference in the expression

15_.

Ibid., p. 272.

16Ibid., p. 273.
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of the same basic inclination. Thus, when the inclination
receives expression through the understanding it is called
the "heart," and when it receives its expression in direct
action it is called "will."
.Another question must be introduced at this point-the question of the affections. They are identified by
Edwards as "the more vigorous and sensible exercises of

17

the inclination and will of the soul." What precise
meaning does he intend for the affections here? On first

hand it would appear that they are identical with the will
to the exclusion of the understanding. But this would be
an overly simplified interpretation. The affections are the
more visible and sensible exercises or inclination, to
be sure; but specifically they are the expressions of inclination through the mind as well as through the overt
action of the will. Affections are not bare feelings
or blind passions, but orientations within .the soul which
are guided by the light of understanding.
It must be confessed, however^ that Edwards was
inclined to see the identification of the will and the
affections as most fundamental.
A

.

.

>

] The will, and the affections of the soul, are
not two faculties; the affections are not essen-

tially distinct from the will, nor do they differ
^ from the mere actings of the will and inclination
^

I

1

17

•

•

Ibid., p. 96.
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of the soul, but only in the liveliness and
sensibleness of exercise,^
The foundation is prepared here for his doctrine on the
freedom of the will, the most influential aspect of
Edwards' philosophy in relation to later American theory
and our latter day impressions of intellectual American
Calvinism. However, that is not to indicate it is therefore of greater value as a tool in understanding of Edwards'
thought than is "affections." A person wills only what his
heart inclines to; the will is identified with the strongest inclination. "The will is always determined by the
strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the
.19

greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition."
But the most vigorous inclinations are what he calls the
affections. In abolishing any permanent difference be-

tween mind and will, and seeing their connection with inclination, Edwards strikes out in a direction which leads
him far away from Locke who insisted on maintaining a
rigorous distinction between "will and desire," saying
that a man may will something but not desire it. Edwards
rejects this argument by noting that the objects of will
and desire, in this case are two in number. His

18Ibid., p. 97.
19_

Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven:
Yale University Press, -1957) , p. 148. Here can be found
a full discussion of this particular aspect of Edwards'
thought, and its relationship to the theories of John
Lo eke •
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conclusion is that the will is desire, or inclination.
This serves as the main thesis of his doctrine on the
freedom of the will.
In every volition there is a preference,
or a prevailing inclination of the soul,
whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of
a state of perfect indifference, with respect
to the direct object of the volition. So that
in every act, or going forth of the will,
there is some preponderation of the mind
or inclination, one way rather than another;
and the soul had rather have or do one thing
rather than another; or than not to have or do
that thing; and that there, where there is
absolutely no prefering or choosing, but a
perfect cQQtinuing equilibrium, there is no
volition.
The preponderation or inclination of the soul to act in one
way rather than another originates within the soul itself
according to its mode of experience. In the case of the
regenerate man, the inclination is due to the indwelling
spirit of God, and such a man chooses and acts out. of an
innate sense of good. When a man*s soul is suffused with
divine grace, then is he capable of choosing and acting
in accordance with the highest source of holiness within
him, and his affections truly originate from God and are
oriented toward Him.
In making a final comment on Edwards' doctrine of
the affections and their relation to the will and the
understanding, we would agree with the statement of

20_.

Ibid., p. 140.
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I

I Professor Smith that "it is difficult to avoid confusion"
&,

~a-

over t.heir differences .and mutual connections."'*' While

he perhaps wished to keep them distinguished, he was
I equally concerned to show the fundamental unity and
t-

•

•

.

I
I . integrity of the soul. In the end Edwards never gave us a
f

'

.

satisfactory account of the distinctions and the unity they
{ came to form in the soul,
^

Summing up our discussion of the spiritual understanding, the truly gracious man experiences a universe
which is the radical imaging of God's goodness. The
fundamental characteristic of an aesthetic experience
transfigured by grace is its moral nature. There is no
aesthetic experience of fact which is not a moral experience of value. To illustrate this, Edwards argues that
we can only understand the fact of Christ's mediatorship
if we appreciate the moral beauty of such a position. "Tis
only by the discovery of the beauty of the moral perfection
of Christ, that the believer is let into the knowledge of
i-

the excellency of his person (which, in turn, allows us a

22

I knowledge of) his sufficiency as a mediator.""*'
~f

f We have in this notion of the identification of the
I aesthetic and moral experience, and of the fusion of facts
and values, the heart of Edwards' meaning of experience
•t

•

•

•

i
•"Editor's Introduction," ReJ-igious Affections, p. 14.
j Religious Affections^ p. 273.
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and his most universal insight into the mystery of human
knowledge. The indwelling energy of grace is the unifying
agent of expe.rience. The two universes of the "is" and
the "ought" had been sundered by the analytic process of
reason throughout the centuries. They are now merged into
a single, unified experience of a single reality, a moral
reality whose source is in God.
He that sees the beauty of holiness, or true moral
good, sees the greatest and most important thing in
the world, which is the fullness of all things,
without which all the world is empty, no better
than nothing, yea, worse than nothing. Unless
this is seen, that is worth seeing: for there
is no other true excellency or beauty. Unless
this be understood, nothing is understood, that
is worthy of the ^ercise of the noble faculty
of understanding.
The fusion of facts and values is possible only "in the
lively exercise of grace," whereby a man "easily distinguishes good and evil, and knows at once, what is suitable amiable behavior towards God, and towards man." It
remains outside the province of discursive reason to discern the morally good. A man "judges what is right, as
it were spontaneously, and of himself, without a particular
deduction, by any other arguments than the beauty that is
,24

seen, and goodness that is tasted,"

23Ibid., p. 274.

24

Ibid., p. 282.
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What Edwards calls grace, then, is the medium within
which man intuitively grasps value. But this is also the
medium through which the fusion is effected between the
two orders of human life,. whether they be called the Objective and Inherent Goods, or simply facts and values.
What is achieved by grace is the reconciliation of man's
I religious life and his life in nature, i.e., the super?.

t natural and the natural. The reconciliation is achieved
g

experientially in a new simple idea.
The third element in Edwards' conception of grace is
s,'

<

I love. Nowhere does the universality of his thought sing
1:

I with more brilliance than in his handling of the phenomenon
of love. His "sense of the heart" or "spiritual under-

I

s

A

:-!

1

standing" is a way of viewing the cognitive nature of knowledge. In proposing the thesis that man's cognitive response
to his world is an aesthetic response involving both head
and heart, Edwards' claim to being an American Pascal has
more substance than some writers would be willing to allow.

25

The spiritual understanding is capable of a higher and more
subtle logic than that of discursive reason.

25

In a discussion of the affinities between Edwards
and Pascal remarkable for its lack of insight, Rufus Suter
argues that Pascal's scientific interests were "smothered
by what some of us today would call a pathological obsession
with the morbid side of religion," and that similarly "the
harrowing theology of Edwards . . . swallowed up both his
natural philosophy and science." See "An American Pascal:
Jonathan Edwards," Scientific Monthly, 68 (May, 1949), 338-42
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Love permeates the cognitive and rational life; it
is "the fountain of all affection." What constitutes the
essence of love is a new sense or relish of the divine
beauty shining forth from God and through the created
world. The rational life remains incomplete to the extent
that it is lacking in this taste for excellency. Edwards'
theology rests on the idea that love for God, and not
fear of him, constitutes the heart of rationality. He
celebrates, over and over, the fact that love is the core
of supernatural life. He distinguishes God's love (or
his excellency--the ontological state of love) from his
natural perfections such as greatness and majesty, and tells
us that a sense of these perfections amounts to naught in
us without a sense of his love.
If persons have a great sense of the natural
perfections of God, and are greatly affected
with them, or have any other sight or sense
of the beauty of his moral perfections, it is no
certain sign of his grace: as particularly,
men's having a sense of the awful greatness and
ter-rible majesty of God; for this is only God's
natural perfection, and what men may see, and
yet be entirely blind to the beauty of his moral
perfection, and have nothing of that spiritual
taste which relishes this divine sweetness.
If a man has a sense of fear of God's power without having
a sense of love of his beauty, it is no sign of grace.
What are the implications of this? It means that every

'Religious Affections, p. 263.
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relation between God and man, is imperfect in the absence
of the basic relation--love. Love performs an indispensable cognitive function, for it promotes a type of
certainty—a moral certainty of gracey. which is guaranteed
by its overflow into action. For the affection of love has
its fruition in Christian practice; it takes hold "of the
very inmost springs of life and activity. Herein chiefly
appears the power of true godliness, viz. in its being
effectual in practice."

27

Love's source is in the infinite Godhead, so Edwards
endows it with a transcendence. The creature's love is
by way of participation in transcendent love. Edwards
says that the Divine principle within us "which we have
observed does radically and essentially consist in Divine
..28

.

.

.

.

.

Love, which is God." Through participation in divine
love man is capable of establishing a reciprocal relationship
with God.
Continuity, therefore, is an important category for
Edwards. Since all love participates in the plenitude of
divine love, he establishes a continuing identity of expression throughout the various levels of experience. A single
relation of love stretches from its origins in carnal love
of one's self to the most sublime reach of mystical fusion

27Ibid., p. 393.
28^

...

Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jonathan
Edwards of America, p. 53.
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with God. For.Edwards, love is "the same principle flowing forth towards different objects," It is a single relation reaching out simultaneously to God and creature.
"A Christian love to God, and Christian love to men,
are not properly two distinct principles in the heart.
These varieties are radically the same."

.29

An important consequence of the participated nature
of love is Edwards' re-interpretation of self-love of God.
The Christian precept to love one's neighbor as one's
self is the profusion of self-love, the extension of the
self into its social dimension. But love of neighbor is
possible only through participation in the abundance of
God's love for mankind. Edwards fashions a doctrine of
self-love which makes it a derivative of divine love.
Antecedent to any genuine love of self is disinterested
love of God; self-love is not the cause of love in God,
but a result of it. "A man must first love God • • •
before he will esteem God*s good his own, and before he
will desire the glorifying and enjoying of God, as his
(own) happiness.""" He has to see God as good in Himself
before he can see God as good for him; the former is the
cause of the latter*

29_ .

Selections from the Unpublished Writings of Jona-

than Edwards oif—America-^ p7-^-5-.

'Religious Affections, p. 241.
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Professor Smith, in discussing this point, comments
on the inaccuracy of saying that "self-love is excluded
from the highest relationship between God and man."

31

Edwards defines self-love as the "capacity of enjoyment
or taking delight in anything." So that man's love of
God and of himself "are not opposite things entirely
distinct, but one enters into the nature of the other."

32

In another context Edwards distinguished between "simple
self-love" and "compounded self-love" which helps to clarify
his position« The latter type arises from two sources .
First, self-love originates in the consciousness of a person, a "willing and perceiving being," who desires his own
personal pleasure or delight. Second, it also arises from
a principle which unites "this person with another that
causes the good of another to be its good, and makes that
to become delight which otherwise cannot."" It is compounded self-love that Edwards thinks of in the Nature of
True Virtue when he talks of self-love as benevolence, or
taking happiness in the happiness of others.
How comes our happiness to consist in the
happiness of such as we love, but by our
hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we as it were look on them as
ourselves, and so on their happiness as our

31Ibid., p. 28.
32The ^Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
Notebooks, p. 202.
33Ibid., pp. 203-204.
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own? Men who have benevolence to others have
pleasure when they see other's happiness, because
seeing their happiness gratifies ..some inclination
that was in their hearts before.
So it is quite impossible for a man to love God more than
hLmseIf or to love himself more than God. Self-love of the
compound type is a participated love in its divine original;
it is the effect and not the cause of love in God.
The most important aspect of Edwards' doctrine of
love is its ontological status. It is clear from what has
been said that love as a principle of knowledge is antecedent to any intellectual apprehension, and has a metaphysical structure of its own which he calls the Consent
to Being. This is the most original concept in Edwards'
philosophy. In essence the Consent to Being.is a metaphysical principle whereby all things participate in the full—
ness of Divine Love, and make response to that love. The
response is an act of love which adds a new moral value
to the general scheme of reality. So values are objective
entitiesy sensible phenomena with essences which are grasped
by the perceptive center of man in his heart.
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Works (Dwight ed.). Ill, p. 119.
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CHAPTER VII
1:1

V

I CONSENT TO BEING:
.1

'

A METAPHYSICS OF VALUE
r

Thus far we have had a view of the aesthetic nature
j of Edwards' doctrine of experience. We have seen how it
I took a noval direction away from the narrow formulations
•5.

I

^

_

»

-

_

»

-

j of Locke and Berkeley, and resulted in a significant

•i

,

•

•

J broadening of the meaning of experience. Man's capacity
^ •

for experience is located in his affections which are
j vitalized by the infusion of grace in the form of new simple
•I '

j ideas. This infusion is effected through the instrumentalr

ity of a symbolic medium (i.e., language) so that grace is
extended from the supernatural to the order of nature through
the efficient causality of words and ideas which are the basic
units of experience. Words and ideas have the efficient
power, as special articulations of experience, to generate
new kinds of experience. And so Edwards is prepared to say
that God communicates his grace, or Xove, through the ordinary channels of human experience as they are rendered
meaningful in human language.

Ill
Let me mention briefly three points about the
metaphysics of consent which will occupy our attention
in this section. The first thing to be said about the
consent to being is that it gives Edwards an opening wedge
into the Neo-Platonic tradition and its understanding of
the category of substance. That is to say, with the notion
of consent he fashions a new category which circumvents the
pitfalls of a substance metaphysics, So many classical
theologies have been bedeviled by the attempt to reconcile
Hellenic notions of substance with the Christian mystery
of immanence and transcendence. The importance of the consent to being with respect to this dilemma is found in the
emphasis given to relations vis-a-vis the traditional
understanding of substance.
Second, and perhaps more important, the consent to
being broadens Edwards' aesthetic empiricism and grounds
man's affective life in a transcendent object. The truly
significant fact of the doctrine resides in the concept
of value—that value is an objective reality from which
man derives the sustenance of his spiritual and moral life.
Third, the consent to being is at the heart of a new
theological notion of "Communication" by which Edwards
understands the affective life of man as a response to
the "evocative communication of God. By denoting the
categories of relation, value^, and communication as the
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constitutive elements of consent, we shall come to a full
appreciation of Edwards' metaphysics.

I. THE PRIMACY OF RELATION
I
..
-„-..-,
_...„..-^-.. the conI It
is „
essential
at-....
the outset
to appreciate
s

.
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.

.
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sent to being as a cosmology depicting an organic world.
And we must note carefully the function of relation in
this cosmology. One of the overriding concerns of Edwards'
,:.;'^;^

polemics was the impact of seventeenth century physics on
religious-philosophical mentality.^ A mechanistic
(or what is often termed an organic interpretation in
line with the instrumentalist views of Locke and Hoobes)
view was beginning to prevail in cosmology," and its
effects were being felt within the structure of Calvinism.
When Edv/ards confronted the heresies of Arminianism, he
was really combating the insidious influence of a mechanis—
tie attitude in religious and philosophical matters.
In order to combat mechanism successfully, he saw
that it was not enough simply to dislodge it from its position of primacy. For it had entrenched itself firmly in a

1Afull discussion of the inlfuence of Newton on
Edwards, and of the theological effect of gravity and
atoms will follow in the next chapter.
2rEn this century the notion of the mechanical explanation of all the processes of nature finally hardened into a
dogma of science." A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern
World (New York: Mentor, 1959), p. 597

BasBgn^'"^
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universal scientific mentality, Edwards' polemical mind
was much more subtle than to launch a frontal attack on
mechanical explanation. He did not overpower mechanism,
but sought to place it into a wider context within which
its truths would be absorbed into the truths of aesthetic
experience. This he achieved admirably in the consent to
being.
The doctrine is a cosmology in the wider sense of
an aesthetic experience. It is an attempt to portray the
world as an organic scheme in which the notion of substance
as the underlying entity is given wider meaning. In a
mechanical world substance has simple location, to borrow
3

-.

.

I the term from Whitehead." It is where it is, in space
I and time, without reference to any other region of space

ji
t.

or duration of time. Substance as the ultimate constituent of reality (in the Aristotelian sense), has a self-

i.

j contained existence. If we pursue this notion a bit we
i
t

I discover that the meaning of a simply located entity, its
I

•

_

.

•

•

j raison^jd'etre or its intelligibility, does not extend
?

j beyond the fact of its simple location, but is totally
;(

j contained therein. Its whole meaning is to be found
(

I

3^

.

Science and the Modern World, pp. 50-54, 57. Whitej head sums up the inadequacy o ^"mechanical philosophy to
j handle the categories of organic life: "the seventeenth
I century scheme of scientific ideas involves a fundamental
duality, with material on the one hand, and on the other
hand;mind. In between there lie the concepts of life,
organism, function, instantaneous reality, interaction,
order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel
of the whole system."
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within the fact that it is a discrete substance. Descartes
noted that clarity and distinctness are the hallmarks of
our comprehension of it.
But in the organic view, the meaning of substance
is to be found in its relations beyond itself as a
simply located thing. If we'may use the terms "representation" and "autonomy" to describe the two ways in which
substance can possibly existy then we must say its primary
mode of existing is representative. A substance represents
the total scheme into which it fits. Its intrinsic meaning
resides in the relations it bears to that scheme. Any
autonomous existence that can be attributed to it is a
derivative of its representative nature. It gains its
indpeendence as a discrete entity from the way it represents. Its autonomy is a function of its representation.
There is one relation, however, which is fundamental
and determinative of all other relations. It is the relation a thing bears to consciousness. This relation above
all others determines the fundamental meaning of a thing
and no entity is lacking in it, according to Edwards.
No principle in his philosophy is as basic as the enunciation that every entity has a relation to the infinite and
all-comprehending mind of God,
That, which truly is the Substance of all
Bodies, is the infinitely exact, and precise,
and perfectly stable Idea, in God's mind, together
with his stable Will, that the same shall gradually
be communicated to us,, and to other minds, accord-

ing to certain fixed and established Methods and
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Laws; or in somewhat different language, the
infinitely exact and precise Divine Idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact,
precise, and stableWill, with respect to correspondent communications tff Created Minds, and
the effects on their minds.
The consent to being rests on this primary relation matter
has to thought. It is an organic view of material nature
wherein the meaning of material entities is derived from
their relation to higher consciousness. Therefore, this
relation is not extrinsic or tangential to the material
world; it is an intrinsic dimension of every entity. The
world becomes an expression of consciousness, the articulation of a spiritual mind. It destroys the view of nature
as the loose juxtaposition of entities, and replaces it
with the view of an organic-aesthetic arrangement of things
within the purview of divine consciousness. Things are not
outside God, but inside; and their radical "thingness" is
lost in their intrinsic relationship to his mind.
The doctrine of consent rests on the idealism of
Edwards, in the primacy of consciousness, as the universal
relation underlying all being. If we inquire as to the
specific nature of the relation, we see that it focuses on
excellence. The universal relation of matter to mind, and
of being to consciousness, is aesthetic in nature.
Excellence is the mark of God's beauty in the world, and

4

'Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 674.
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it consists in the highest degree of "similarness" among
all things, "This is an universal definition of Excellency: — The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's Consent to Entity. The more the Consent is, and the more
extensive, the greater is the Excellency."" The more
universal the consciousness, the greater is the presence
of God's beauty.
Thus greatness becomes the criterion for God's
beauty, for it is defined as the capacity for excellence*
"The greater a Being is, and the more it has of Entity,
the more will Consent to Being in general please it."

It follows quite evidently that only an infinite capacity
for excellence can be the aesthetic criterion. And indeed
this is so, for "not only may Greatness be considered as a
capacity of Excellency; but a Being, by reason of his
greatness considered alone, is the more excellent, because
he partakes more of being." It follows as a corollary that
"it is impossible that God should be any otherwise, than
excellent; for he is the Infinite, Universal and Allcomprehending Existence."" God is the infinite criterion
of beauty because he has an infinite capacity for it; and
every created entity represents, to the extent of its own
capacity, the infinite beauty of God. Every creature, in
other words, has an intrinsic relation to the

. 5Ibid., p. 696.
6Ibid., p. 698.
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"All-comprehending" beauty of its creator.
Excellence is primarily the consent of minds. "There

7

is no other proper consent but that of Minds." And so
beauty c.an be predicated only of beings with a spiritual
and moral nature. Yet there is an inferior kind of beauty
found in inanimate things which is an image of spiritual ,
moral beauty. It "consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things in form, manner, quantity, and
visible end or design." But most especially does the consent consist in the agreement of the purpose or design of
all material things with each other. For in this kind of
agreement, beauty is achieved in the uniformity of purpose
and design throughout the variety of things•.
The beauty which consists in the visible fitness
of a thing to its use and unity of design, is not
a distinct sort of beauty from this (beauty of
uniformity amidst variety). For it is to be observed, that one thing which contributes to the
beauty of the agreement and proportion of various
things, is their relation to one another; into
view and consideration^ and whereby one suggests
the other to the mind.
What Edwards attempts to demonstrate is the unity of the

utility of material things (in the way they harmonize) with
the glory of God's higher beauty. The former images the
latter, because by the uniformity of their utility,
"diverse things become as it were one • . • • And it

7Ibid., p. 699.
8Works_ (Worcester ed.) II, pp. 413-14. (Italics mine.)
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pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is manifest in fact in innumerable instances; and especially to
establish inferior things in an ananlogy to superior,"

9

Edwards suggests that in an organic world in which
everything images the "All-comprehending" mind of God, the

utility of material things and the glory of God's beauty
form a single continuous whole. So that in such a world
as this, meanings which attach to material things are at
once physical and spiritual, utilitarian and aesthetic.
Physical events immediately suggest to the mind their
relationship with a non-physical reality of' an aesthetic
and moral nature. They are the immediate occasion for a
person inclined toward moral virtue to experience the con10 _.

tinuity between utility and glory." Edwards himself was
naturally disposed to tracing out the hidden moral significance behind the external forms of nature. He was inclined
to think of nature symbolically, that its design and purpose is connected with and representative of (partially,
from its own perspective) a universal moral plan.

Ibid., p. 415.

"God has so constituted nature, that the presenting of this inferior beauty ... as the harmony of
sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to
assist those whose hearts are under the influence of a
truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises
of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual
beauty." Ibid.

1^
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II. CONSENT AND THE RESPONSE TO VALUE

We have yet to consider the consent to being as the
cornerstone of a metaphysical system in which value is
bestowed with the status of an objective and transcendent
reality. Behind the consent is the idea that God is the
universal source of moral consciousness, and that this
universal moral consciousness is mirrored throughout creation. Every entity, both animate and inanimate, intelligent and non-intelligent, reflects this universality, each
to the extent of its capacity. Value, therefore, is an
ultimate ontological category as much as being and truth.
Edwards' reasoning follows this line, The essence of
consciousness is situated in conation, which is the inclination and movement of mind toward the possession of that
which lies beyond it, and is good in itself. Universal
consciousness represents the total, actual possession of
the object of its inclination, and so every object of
universal moral consciousness possesses actual moral value.
The distinctive difference in all this for Edwards is
that man experiences these values. Immersed as he is in a
i

I world of concrete values, man's access to them is not
I '

through re-ason, but primarily within experience* In the
I

'

-

.

j profound depths of experience we reach immediate contact
with the reflected image of moral consciousness. We do not
enter into this image by intellectuality, but we seize upon
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it in experience. These values which constitute the nature
of true consent are integral components of every experience. They do not need to be mediated by reason operating
alone and apart from direct perception. Indeed it becomes

impossible to behold the objectivity of values with the
speculative faculty if one truly apprehends with a sense
of the heart.
When we look at the notion of excellency more
closely, it becomes evident that Edwards sees it as a
universal system which interlocks its various components
into an ordered whole< A beautiful thing is. false and
deformed when "considered by itself separately," i.e. when
it falls shorty in its comprehension, of relating to universal being. That which is beautiful "only with respect
to itself and a few other things, and not as a part of
that which contains all things—the Universe—false beauty
and a confined beauty. That which is beautiful, with
respect to the university of things, has a generally extended excellence and a true beauty."*"^

AXso evident is the contrality of Mind. So that
bodies, the objects of our external sense, "are but the
shadows of beings." The idea of excellency as a system
of universal consent implies that beneath it all is a
rational intelligence. Beauty, therefore, consists first

Works (Dwight ed.), I, p. 697.
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and foremost in the consent of intelligent beings to the
universal system of intelligence.
If every intelligent Being is some way related
to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connexion with the whole; what can its general and
true beauty,^e, but its union and consent with the
geat whole.1:
It follows that Edwards would designate the beauty of intelligent beings as virtue. Virtue is something beautifuly not the beauty of flowers or rainbows,"" but the
beauty belonging "to Beings that have perception and
will. • • • a beauty that has its original seat in the
mind • ••14
" * '

The highest beauty consists in the highest act an
intelligent being is capable of — love. Consent to
being is the mutual love of all "spiritual beings," and
the mutual consent of all lower creatures is an image
of this love.*" Virtue most essentially consists in love,

Works (Worcester edj, II, p. 397.
'Except in a secondary, participated sense,
Wqrks. (Worcester ed.), II, p. 395.
'"When one thing sweetly harmonizes with another, as
the Notes in musick, the notes are so conformed, and have
such proportion one to another, that they seem to have respect one to another, as if they loved one another. So the
beauty of figures and motions is, when one part has such
consonant proportion with the rest, as represents a general
agreeing and consenting together; which is very much the
image of Love, in all the parts of a Society, united by a
sweet consent and charity of heart." Works (Dwight ed.) ,
Vol. I, p. 697.
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but a participated love derived from God's own nature. This
is why Edwards insists that virtue consists in nothing short
of a particular being's love to being in general. The
true consent of any being is the measure of its participation in being in general, i.e. universal love.
No one act of the mind or exercise of love
is of the nature of true virtue, but what has
being in general, or the great system of universal
existence, for its direct and immediate object
• • • .No affection towards particular persons,
or Beings, are of the nature of true virtue, but
such as arise from a generally benevolent temper,
or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein p^nsists a disposition to love Being in general.
There can be no question for Edwards but that all
love is firmly grounded in divine love as its "direct and
immediate object." Love among created beings can only be
virtuous when it is derived from love to God."' But love
to God cannot be different from a sharing in his love for
the world. Creatures share in God's love by consenting
to the design and purpose for which he makes all things.
But the design and purpose of all things coincides with
the design and purpose of moral creatures, "it being
evident, that the moral world is the end of the rest of
the world,""" So Edwards gives a metaphysical priority to

'Works (Worcester edj, II, p. 398.
17.._.

"It is sufficient to render love to any created
Being virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely," Ibid.,
p. 411.
18Ibid., p. 412.
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the moral world over the physical, thereby adding a new
dimension to every reality--the dimension of value. Everything has value insofar as it is the object of universal
moral consciousness--is, in other words, the object of
God's love. But the full measure of participation in this
new value-dimension is reserved for man, who, with a
sense of the heart, is capable of experiencing it.
The full meaning of consent is to be found, then^
in the sense of the heart and man's affective relation
to the world. The aesthetic nature of this relation
points up his ability to experience values as concrete,
sensible phenomena, and to make response to them. It
is plain enough that fhe consent to being is a response
to value: the conscious, intentional affirmation of
objective value which takes the form of moral, affective
response. It is also clear that it consists in a transcendent relation to the universal moral consciousness of
God. It pertains to the nature of true virtue, Edwards
tells us, to have being in general as the primary object
of its benevolence. "Or perhaps to speak more accurately/
it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being
in general, that is immediately exercised in a general
19 „,„.

good will."" Virtue cannot be authentic if benevolence
be limited in any way "to a particular circle of.Beings."

'Works (Worcester ed.), I, p. 397.
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For then the value response does not genuinely transcend,
because the limitation must come from the subjective side.
It must.be imposed arbitrarily by the subject. And so
there is no conformity at all when virtue is restricted
by the "private affections" as Edwards calls them.

III. CONSENT AND THE THEOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION

Thus far we have established that consent, of virtue,
is the relation an entity bears to universal moral consciousness, and is in itself the participation in and
response to the objective value that constitutes the nature
of moral consciousness. We have also seen that man's
place in this scheme of values is eminent, for he participates fully by conscious, direct experience.
His consent, in other words, is first in rank among
creatures, the consent of lower things participates only
through man's consent. Only he has the ability to grasp
in an intuition the meaning of that relation we call consent or virtue. By his ability to grasp this relation as

20

such,"" man is endowed with a moral consciousness above all
other creatures. More accurately, he is capable of intuiting the universal moral consciousness of God and thereby
capable of sharing in its nature,

20_

Perry Miller writes that true virtue "is an elevation of consciousness above the web of relations to the
idea of relationship itself." Jonathan Edwards, p. 287.
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A most important aspect of this doctrine is to be
found in the notion of communication, or conversation.
Edwards defines conversation as "intelligent beings expressing their minds one to another, in words or other
.21

..

signs,"" and he tells us that we especially find conversation among intelligent beings when they are concerned
with moral affairs. The existence of objective moral value
makes language necessary as a symbolic medium because discourse is of the essence of the moral order. "All moral
agents are conversable agents/' i.e. they are capable
of consent, or response to value, and this in itself is
what Edwards means by conversation.
Especially do we find conversation proper
and requisite between intelligent creatures
concerning moral affairs, which are most
important: affairs wherein especially moral
agents are concerned, as joined with society,
, and having union and communion with one
\ another. • • • By all that we see and experiI ence, the moral wor^, and the conversable world,
\ are the same thing.
I

Consent to being, the response to objective value and its
source in God, is really a form of discourse. Just as the
dialectic was an instrument for the discovery of truth
for Socrates, discourse is the medium for the emergence
of values for Edwards. Moral values arise out of discourse, for it is Hie very nature of conversation to generate

21.

'"On the Medium of Moral Government—particularly
Conversation," Wprks^ (Dwight ed.), VII, p., 277»
'Ibid., p. 281.
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values. But by conversation Edwards means experiential
commerce between a person and his world and God.
This commerce, or moral conversation between God and
man in the consent to being has its seat in the communicative nature of God. Edwards' understanding of creation is
expressed in terms of this nature in The End For Which God
Created The World. God does not create the world as an
•\

effect, in the sense of an after-thought or an addendum to
his own being. Creation is not a fact extrinsic to his
nature. The mode of his creation is communication, and he
communicates a manifestation of himself, The nature of
God is infinite goodness, and this infinite goodness is
utterly conununicative. The world, therefore, is no
detached fact, but the communicated value of God's own
goodness. If the plenitude of goodness, the fullness of
every perfection
is capable of communication or emanation ad
extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communFcated
or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of
good should send forth abundant streams, that

this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light
all around.

It follows that
if the fullness of good that is in the fountain/ is in itself excellent and worthy to exist,
then the emanation, or that which is as it were
an increase, repetition or multiplicafc,i,on of
it, is excellent and worthy to exist.'

23

'Works^(Worcester ed.), VI, pp. 32-33. (Italics mine.)
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What is communicated, then, possesses value inasmuch as it
is the outpouring of the plenitude of value. It seems
fitting that man should participate in the communication
of God's excellency in a special way through his intellect
and will. It appears "to be a thing in itself valuable,
that there should be such things as the knowledge of God's
glory in other beings, and an high esteem of it, love to
it" because these things are "the emanation of God's own
knowledge, holiness and joy."
It is a thing valuable and desirable in
itself, that God's glory should be seen and
known • • . valued and esteemed, loved and

delighted in.
But of the two ways of participation, mind and heart,
Edwards chooses the latter as superior to the former,
"If the idea of God's perfection in the understanding be
valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be more
especially valuable, as moral beauty especially consists
in the disposition and affection of the heart,

24

We can reasonably conclude that God* s communication
of objective value and man's participation in it has an
experiential base in the affections. Experience is the
specific medium through which God and man conduct their
commerce. God communicates a concrete world of value, and
man responds to it with his concrete affections. Understanding plays an important but secondary role in this

24_.

Ibid., p. 32.
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response. But-we must point out that a medium is by definition symbolic, whether it be called experience, language,
or discourse. Whatever it be, its sole function is to
refer an agent beyond itself, to transport an individual
into a matrix of relations and patterns which find
their ultimate unity in a transcendent God.
Also, a symbolic medium is evocative, and herein
lies a most significant aspect of the consent to being.
A world which is the emanation of God's supreme value
evokes a response from man in some way commensurable with
itself. Consent to being implies a world speaking to man,
an evocative world which draws man out of himself and into
a meaningful conversation with it. To stand in the presence of God's manifest glory is to stand in the midst of
objects capable of stirring up within man meaningful correspondences• These correspondences are of a moral and
aesthetic character. Man gains full access to such a
world by attuning all his faculties of head and heart,
Every external fact has a subjective dimension in
man, for the fact itself emerges from the fruitful dialogue
he engaged in with an evocative world. Through his
affectivity man is capable of adding this new dimension
to physical facts. Things are emanations of God. The
outer world is Subjective Fact, a Subjective Experience
into which man enters through his own subjectivity. There
are no discrete subjects and discrete objects, but there is
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one system of mutual consent of all things among themselves
and to God.
But many of these remarks anticipate questions to be
raised in the next section, My conclusion here is that to
Edwards man transcends himself in the moral experience of
an objective value through the symbolic medium of a created world, to its source in God.

CHAPTER VIII
EDWARDS' METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY:
1.

II

.

.

-

-

THE PRESENCE OF GOD DISCERNED
•

We would be grossly mistaken to suppose our interprej tation of the consent to being to be complete at this point.
I It is certainly valie as far as it goes: The consent is
t

{ essentially a system of objective values which issues
I

.'

..

I forth from the affective affinity of all things in God.
I
But to leave it at this would be to miss the major point of
t

I

Edwards' philosophical endeavor. He never intended philoso-

I phy to have any purpose apart from theology, and the whole

I

j direction of his intellectual inquiry was toward the study
I of divinity. He saw his life's work as neither establishing an ethics nor a system of metaphysics so much
i

j as confronting the mystery of God's presence. He was

I
T;

j dedicated to the validation of religious experience and
the many ways in which we perceive the divine nature. In
failing to appreciate this, while his theory is of great
secular value, we would have failed as much as to have
missed the religious motivation in the work of a
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Kirkegaard or a .Teilhard de Chardin."
If we would come to appreciate Edwards* metaphysics
at all, we must look to his theology and probe it for his
originality on the subject of God's nature and of the

2

manner of his presence to man," The full significance
of all the aspects of his philosophy--especially the
doctrine of experience and the importance of its
aesthetic dimension, and also the objectification of
aesthetic experience in the consent to being--resides
here in the core of his theology. Christian thought
has traditionally focused attention on the compatability
of a transcendent God who takes his abode in the cosmos
of man's experience while still maintaining his full
transcendence. It is apparent throughout the work of
Edwards that the roots of Christianity are in the mystery

'By the time a reader has advanced to this point in
his analysis of the discussion under way, he should be fully
aware of the fact that while Jonathan Edwards did incorporate
the doctrine of experience into his own philosophical conception of perception, he did this as a devout Calvinist minister in Puritan New England of the late Seventeenth and early
Eighteenth centuries. Therefore, we must expect him to integrate his empiricism into a rigorous religiously focused
paradigm in keeping with both his cultural and religious orientation; Edwards could not have done otherwise. Thus, as
we proceed we must remain cognizant of this point of reference, regarding particularly the ensuing discussion of Edwards* Metaphysical Theology, lest the significance of our
analysis should prove elusive.
2 -

'The central question of Puritan Protestantism, John E.
Smith tells us, is precisely this: "How shall the presence of
the divine Spirit be discerned?" And in the Great Awakening
this question reaches a cultural climax. "Editor's Introduction," Religious Affections, p. !•
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of a transcendent-immanent Deity, and that all theological
problems and major historical crises of Christianity are
variations of this one theme. The Incarnation by its
nature is a doctrine which promotes historical and cultural
tensions in experience as well as in thought» Christianity
as a lived experience has a fundamental ambivalence
built into it, an ambivalence which is born out of the
struggle to convert the mystery of the Incarnation into
concrete reality. It is not too extravagant to say that
we see this inner tension personified in the life and
thought of Edwards, and that he was.dedicated, to coming to
grips with the Incarnated God in the fullness of his concrete presence.

Perhaps no one in the colonies understood better the
revolution that science and philosophy had worked in the
eighteenth century mind, and the implications it held
for traditional doctrine. And perhaps there was none
better equipped to inrdocue these new ideas into a
theologically oriented setting. The traditional problem
of Presence was understood by Edwards in these specific
terms: How does God fit into the new world-scheme of Newton and Locke?" What aspect of the world of Newton's
psychology would refer to the God of Christian revelation?
In answering these questions, he was interested in preserving

See Perry Miller's discussion of this point in Jonathan Edwards, Chapters on "The Inherent Good," "The Objective
Good/' and "Naturalism."
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the classical Calvinist doctrine of God as the ground of
being. But more than this, he wanted to show that this God
is the ground of the Newtonian-Lockean Universe,
Why should Edwards be singled out as having greater
success at the reconciliation of science and religion
than his contemporaries? Why should he have seen, as a
young student, that Newton and Locke taken together constitute a radical shift away from the traditional concepts of
God? Many factors of biography, history, and the nature of
his own intellect, too numerous and complex to mention here,
account for his uniqueness in the America of'the early eighteenth century. But if we demand an answer, I think it must
be found in the degree of seriousness with which he accept
experience as the primary source of our knowledge of both
God and the physical universe. More than the others of his
generation, he saw the urgency of resolving the religious
crisis completely within experience, or of facing the
alternative possibility of not resolving it at all <
This, then, will be the chief purpose of our present
discussion: to show the degree of success he had in applying the principles of experience to the problems of theology
with the specific intention of penetrating the mystery of
God's presence. First, it is necessary to see something of
his understanding of the new science, of the manner in
which he converted the mechanical physics of Newton into
an organic metaphysics, thereby paving the way for a conception of God as the ground of organic nature. Then we will
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be able to show that within th is metaphysical context
Edwards develops a doctrine of nature as sacrament, whereby all creatures in QSSQ are symbols of God, the objective
presence of the transcendent Deity.

I, THE THEOLOGY OF ATOMS, SPACE AND GRAVITY

Edwards' scientific interests and the relationship
between science and theology in his thought have been the

4

subject of many studies.' It seems an established fact
that science affected his idea of God, and that his
theological categories were formed.and continued to be
shaped by his interest as a college student in Newton.
The original Dummer collection of books at Yale included
the Opticks and the Principia to which he had access.
His "Notes on Natural Science" was probably written at

4_

'For the best literature on Edwards' knowledge of science, see the following: James Tufts, "Edwards and Newton,"
Philosophical Review, XLIX (Nov. 1940) ; Rufus Suter, "An
American Pascal; Jonathan Edwards," ScientifjLc Monthly, 63
(May, 1949)^ 338-42; Harvey G. Towns end ^"J'onathaiT Edwards '
Later Observations of Nature," New England Quarterly, XIII
(Sept. 1940) ,510-18; Clarence H. Faust, "Jonathan Edwards
as a Scientist," American Literature, I (1930) , 393-404;
Theodore Hornberger, "The Effect of the New Science Upon the
Thought of Jonathan Edwards y" Amen.can_ Literature, IX (1937),
196-207; Henry C. McCook, "Jonathan E-dw-ards—as^ a-Na'£uralist,"

Presbyterian and Reformed Review, I (July, 1890), 393-402.
Harvey G. Townsend writes that a fundamental belief of Edwards is "that the physical world is the direct expression
of God*s being and naturey and therefore that physical science is the source of man's knowledge of God." The Philosophy
of Jonathan Edwards^ from his Private Notebooks, ~p'7~~\mT7'
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this timey" as a result of his contact with the British
physicist. Some writers argue that he was side-tracked
from a promising career in science by his conversion experience, and that the pursuit of theological matters
diverted his attention from the natural world. But the
evidence is to the contrary. Clarence Faust, for example,
says that his theology was a direct development of his scientific activity. And Carl Van Doren writes that his
"profession from science and philosophy to theology was
in no sense a desertion; the three subjects possessed him
side by side."" A. C< McGiffert suggests that his understanding of God derives from physics as well as theology:
"As to the existence of God, he had long since reached a
positive conclusion, driven thereto by the three-fold
suggestions of physics--God is space; of philosophy--God
is mind; and of religious experience--God is the source
,7

---...

of our intuitions•"' We find supporting evidence for this
thesis in Douglas Elwood." And the entire work of Perry
Miller is premised on the continuity of science and theology.

5W6rks, (Dwight ed.), I, p. 41,
Selections from Franklin and Edwards, (New York:
C. Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. xiii.

7

J on ath an J; dw ards , p« 175•

'The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, pp< 9-10.
9Jonathan Edwards, passim. The quote is taken from p."/2.
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Edwards would not compartmentalize his
thinking. He is the last great American,
perhaps the last European, for whom there
could be no warfare between religion and
science. • . . He was incapable of accepting
Christianity and physics on separate premises.
How, then, did he render a theological interpretation
of the then contemporary interpretation of Newtonian physics? The answer begins not with Edwards but with Newton
himself, for Newton, the eighteenth century man and deist,
had devoted considerable effort to establishing an amicable
relationship between his mathematical physics and a wider
theological view of the world. In fact, it was one of his
primary concerns to introduce God into his mechanical
scheme not as a superfluous embellishment, but as an
integral factor in the whole system* "Religion was something quite basic to him and in no sense a mere appendage
to his science or an accidental addition to his meta.10

physics•"

For Newton the world of matter is ultimately composed
of indestructible atoms which combine to form bodies capable
of being seen and of being measured mathematically.

loBurtt, p. 284.
'He writes in the Opticks: "God in the beginning
formed matter in solid, massy,~hard, impenetrable, movable
particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other
properties, in such proportion to space, as most conduced
to the end for which he formed them; and that these primitive particles, being solids , are incomparably harder than
any p.orous bodies compounded of them;: even so very hard, as
never to wear or break in pieces: no ordinary power being
able to divide what God himself made on in the first creation." Quoted in Burtt, pp. 232-33. .
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They move about within the frame of absolute space and
time. The existence of absolute space being subject to
empirical verification. And so the absolute motions of
bodies can be determined by a reference to it» Their
relative motions can be calculated by a reference to other
bodies which are themselves in motion. Bodies move in
absolute space and with reference to measurement in time.
To the scientist for whom an experimental proof is always
desirable, the postulation of absolute space is necessary
in terms of such calculations as these regarding the proof
of atomic movement. However, as Newton observes in Opticks,
in relation to his discourse on the phenomenon of space and
time, an absolute cause of creation must be traced back to
an all powerful source substance termed God• Two factors
,12

have relevance here—the omnipresence of God*" and the
infinite scene of his knowledge:
Does it not appear from phenomena that there
is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent,
omnipresent, who in infinite space, as it were
in his sensory, sees the things themselves
intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and
comprehends them who^y by their immediate
presence to himself.'*"'

"(God) endures for ever, and is everywhere present;
and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. • • . He is omnipresent, not virtually
only, but also substantially, for virtue cannot subsist
without substance." Principles. Quoted in Burtt, p. 258.
13, . .

Opticks. Quoted in Burtt, p. 260,
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If absolute space is God's sensorium, then all physical
motion remains ultimately resolved by a reference to that
which passes beyond the realm of empirical verification
and into the realm of theology. It is here that Newton
finds the ultimate explanation of motion and gravity. The
mind of God, while not the absolute center of reference
for all things in space and time, is, however, in the deistie sense, the ultimate and original source of all motion
as its first creative cause, "All real or absolute motion
in the last analysis is the resultant of an expenditure of
.14

divine energy."

Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, when Edwards was reading Newton, absolute space had lost its theological significance. It was transformed from the organ
of God's perception into an impersonal, fixed framework,
geometric in nature, originally set in motion by divine
creation, which functioned solely as the measure of mass
in motion.J"^ The world of necessity was no longer viewed
within a divinely transcendent context, but now stood as
an independent machine of immense complexity. The concept
of a world-machine prevailed where once Newton has sought
desperately to place mechanical physics into a wider

14Burtt, p. 261.
15Burtt writes: Absolute space was "divested of both
logical and theological excuse, but yet unquestionably
assumed as an infinite theatre in which, and an unchangeable entity against which, the world-machine continued its
clocklike movements." Ibid,, p, 262.
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theological setting. With such a view. God has been
reduced to the minimal role of an absentee landlord, and
deism issued forth as a popular religious consequence.
It can be said of Edwards that he represents a notable exception to the deistic tendency of the eighteenth
16

.....

century." His interpretation of Newton, quite contrary

to the prevailing mood in scientific and philosophic
circlesy was entirely consonant with his religious convictions of a God who in some mysterious way is organically
continuous with the world at the same time that he is the
independent foundation of it. In other words, he accomplished with remarkable facility what other theological minds
of his time attempted, but only with a great deal of agony.
He assimilated the Newtonian conception of atoms, absolute
space, and gravity, to a theological system which was an
enrichment of the traditional themes of Calvin and Augustine
But more than this, he effected a complete transmutation of
these themes into something quite new and startlingly different in the order of theological explanation.
We are struck immediately by the noticeable shift in
theological metaphor--a shift from mechanical conception

'In a nineteenth century work on the theology of
Edwards, Alexander V. G. Alien writes: "At a time when the
prevailing Deism represented God as if a passive agent,
governing the world by general laws and second causes,
as well as far removed from the scene of human activity,
Edwards presented Deity as immanent and efficient will."
Jonathan Edwards (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co.,
1889), p. b8.
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to organic conception. By stripping the fudamental principles of Newtonian physics of their mechanical connota17 .

tion," atoms, space, and gravity acquired new significance
as basic metaphors of an organic cosmology. This allowed
Edwards to say things about the nature of God which had not
been said by any other theologian with as staunch a sense
of orthodoxy as his. In proclaiming that the transcendent
sovereign God is also the immanent principle of an organically structured world, Edwards was not aware of himself as
heretical or in any way exceptional to orthodox Calvinism.
To him it was a matter of enlisting the concepts of physical
matter--or atoms, spacef and gravity—into the service of
traditional theology.
Let us now look at the way he proposes to do this.
It can be shown, I believe, that he adapts the rudiments
of Newtonian science to a theological purpose in these
successive but related steps. First, he broadens the
definition of an atom so as to mean any integral unit of
being. An atom is an inviolate whole, an entity with an
integrity of its own. As an integral whole, it manifests
one of the basic properties of an organism: it exists in
protection of its wholeness. Second, space is an atom,

17

"Hence we learn, that there is no such things as
Mechanism; if that word is intended to denote that, whereby
bodies act, each upon the other, purely and properly by
themselves." "Notes on Natural Science," Works
(Dwight ed.), I, p. 714.
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a unit of life with self-possessed integrity. But it is
also infinite, and so Edwards identified space with the
ultimate unit which men call God. Third, since the unity

of space (and everything within it) is accounted for by
gravity. God providing all worldly perfection, then gravity
must be theologically identical with grace. Grace, as we
had seen in a previous chapter, is the medium through
which God and his world (or the ultimate unit of space
and everything within it) achieve their unity and harmony,
The term grace denotes for Edwards the vast network of
relations between God (as the ultimate unit of space)
and his various manifestations:
First, the atom.
All bodies whatsoever, except Atoms themselves,
must, of absolute necessity, be composed of Atoms,
or of bodies that are indiscernible (sic), that
cannot be made less, or whose parts cannot, ^y any
finite power, be separated from one another.
The common conception of the atom has always been of a tiny
particle incapable of any further reduction. But Edwards
rejects this as too simple and distorted a picture. An
atom, he tells us, is really a plenum, and has "every part
of space (in miniature scaled form) included within its
surface." It resists every finite effort to be divided,
because it is a unity, a whole, and jealously.protects its
integrity. So the physical hallmark of an atom is its

r8Ibid., pp. 708-709.
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resistance to the intrusion of anything that would destroy
its unity and hence its being, just as the universe becomes
absolute space.
The conception of the atom as a plenum is not a
priori assertion, but the application of Lockean empiricism
to a basic philosophical issue; what is a body? Experience
teaches us to call those parts of space bodies in which
the motion of another body is terminated and resisted.
Bodies resist violation of their parts of space to the
extent that they are perfectly solid. This is manifested
in experience, according to Edwards. "It is intuitively
certain, that, if Solidity be removed from Body, nothing
,19

is left but empty space,"'" So if a body connotes solidity,

then a body with absolute solidity is indiscernible; it is
a plenum or an atom. In scientific jargon, he defines
the atom as "a body whose parts are no ways separated
by pores, but has all its parts conjoined by an absolute
.20

continuity of matter."

So an atom has nothing to do with size. Its nature
is marked by the ability to resist annihilation, and the
ability to persevere and maintain its autonomy. This
ability is attributed to its solidity. "An atom • • •
does not at all consist in littleness, as generally used

19Ibid., p. 674.
20Ibid., p. 724.
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to be thought-; for by our philosophy an Atom may be as big
as the Universe; because any body, of whatsoever bigness,
were an atom, if it were a perfect solid. "*"b When we strip
away the references to physical matter in Edwards' discussion of the atom (they are incidental to his overall purpose which is metaphysical and theological), we are left
with this definition: an atom is an entity having integrity by virtue of its "solidity/'i.e., by virtue of the
absolute continuity and homogeneity of the substance of
which it is composed.
Accordingly, as Edwards discerns space, absolute space
fulfills the requirements of an atom. In the essay "Of
Being," in which he outlines the principles of his idealism,
Edwards contrasts the repugnant concept of nothing to the
notion of "necessary, eternal, infinite, and omnipresent"
space. Space is the only concept that can properly oppose
the contradiction of nothingness, for the only way to conceive nothingness is to conceive the total absence of
space. But this is manifestly impossible. Infinite and
omnipresent space cannot have the physical solidity of a
material atom, for solidity implies resistance, and there
is nothing for space to resist. But it does have a
solidify in the abovementioned sense of continuity and
homogeniety.

21Ibid., p. 711.
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If a man'would imagine Space any where to be
divided, so as there should be nothing between
the divided parts, there remains Space between,
notwithstanding, and so the man contradicts
himself.22
Infinite and omnipresent space, therefore, possesses the
same indiscernibility as an atom. He continues, depicting
space as a plenum, an infinite plenum^ by identifying it

with God:
It is self-evident I believe to every man, that
Space is necessary, eternal, infinite and omnipresent. But I had as good speak plain: I have
already said as much as, that Space is God. And
it is indeed clear to me, that all the Space there
is, not proper to body, all the Space there is
without the bounds of creation, all the Space
there was before the Creation, is God himself.
The strong and unequivocal identification of space
with God is less an adaptation of Newton and more of an
expression of something deeply felt within himself. We
may ask: what is the source of his idea of space? It
seems to be such a strong point in his theological system
that we can legitimately doubt if it took shape solely from
a reading of the Opticks< The idea of space as the universal matrix within which things get related in their
mutual consent, must be attributed as much if not more to
his experience of the limitless expanse of the American

22

Ibid., p. 706.

23^,
'Ibid.
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wilderness•"" The fusion of Newton's absolute space with
the geographic space of frontier New England forms the
basis of Edwards' notion of God in "The Mind," and
"Notes on Natural Science." This notion is carried into
his later theologicdl work where he develops the full
meaning of man's experiential approach to God—through
the experience of space,
We turn now to the third element of Newtonian science
—the revolutionary concept of gravity--to see what theological implication it holds for Edwards. Fiyst, on the
level of strict scientific analysis he agrees with Newton
that "the existence and motion of every Atom, has influence, more or less, on the motion of all other bodies
in the Universe, great or small, as is most demonstfable
.25

from the Laws of Gravity and Motion,"" But in a wider
view this means there is a universal attraction "in the
whole system of things" including "the whole system and
series of ideas in all created minds.n^v Universal
24_

For a most enlightening treatment of the role of
space in the formation of the religious mind of early America, see Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment, The Shaping
of Christianity in America (New YorkT: Hamper and Row, 196^3) ;
Chapter I: "The American—People: Their Space, Time and Religion." Mead speaks of the abundance of "organic, pragmatic
space—the space of action." "He who would understand America
must understand that through all the formative years, space
has overshadowed time—has taken precedence over time in the
formation of all the ideals most cherished by the American
mind and spirit." p, 12. '
'Works (Dwight ed.), p< 672.
26Ibid<, p. 671.
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attraction extends to mental atoms, or ideas, as well as to
physical atoms, and is accountable by the underlying presence of the "Supreme mind" to all things.
He tells us further that an atom is really gravity ,
because it is the culmination of an immense concentration
of gravitational force (since it exercises an amount of
attraction, however large or small, over every other
particle in the universe)• "Solidity is gravity; so that,
in some sense, the Essence of bodies is Gravity • • • the
very bare being of body, without supposing harmonious
,27

being, necessarily infers Gravity.""" If gravity, the
power of an atom over every other atom, constitutes the
essence of bodies both real and ideal, then it must be the
exertion of divine power according to Edwards* reasoning:
Creation of the corporeal Universe is nothing
other, than the first causing resistance in such
parts of space as God saw fit, with a power of
being communicated successively, from one part
of space to another, according to such stated
conditions, as his Infinite wisdom directed, and
then the first beginning of this communication,
so that ever after it might be continue^without
deviating from those stated conditions. {
Hence, resistance or solidity strictly speaking is no inherent property of the atom, but the communicated essence
of God's creative power:
The substance of bodies . . • becomes either
nothing, or nothing but the Deity, acting in
that particular manner, in those parts of space

27Ibid., p. 723.
28Ibid., pp. 713-14
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where he thinks fit: so that , • • there is
no proper substance but God himself.
Because it is universally allowed, that
Gravity depends immediately on the Divine influence, and because it may be proved that
Solidity and Gravity are in a good sense the
same, and resolvabIe into each other, and because Solidify has been proved to be the very
being of a body; therefore, we may infallibly
conclude, that the very being, and the manner
of being, and the whole, of bodies depends
immediately on the Divine Being. — if Gravity
should be withdrawn, the whole Universe would
in a moment vanish into nothing; so that not
only the well being of the world depends on
it, but the very being.30
We have here in the idiom of eighteenth century
science a further corroboration of the consent to being—
the insight that the universe is constituted by a network
of internal relations, or mutual consents that go to make
up an organic continuum which is the very matrix of God's
creative power. The matrix manifests itself either
materially as gravity, or spiritually as grace. Regardless of its mode, it is the same manifested energy of
divine creativity—the dynamic presence of a God who
is organically linked to his world. The generic term
grace is used by Edwards to refer to this presence. In
a previous discussion,"" we had seen that grace is an
ontological medium of human experience, the via of man's

29Ibid., p. 713.
30Ibid., p. 724.
31Chapter VI.

148
experience of God and of himself and his world.
What, then, can we say of Edwards' appreciation of
Newton? We can say, first of all, that it was the empirical method that attracted him to the ideas of atoms, space
and gravity--that these were to Edwards articulations on
the level of physics of a profound theological truth. An
atom is a unit with a metaphysical integrity or wholeness ,
and the ultimate atom is infinite and omnipresent space,
or God. The term gravity in the physical order, or grace
in the theological order, adequately describes the relationship between God as the ultimate atom and the infinite
variety of his manifestations or presences. We can almost
say that for Edwards each and every particular atom in its
own simplicity "prehends" the infinite and omnipresent Godi
for "there is not one leaf of a tree, nor a spire of grass"
but what represents a cognition of God's presence "all over
32 _
the universe•"~~ In each and every atom God comes to a

realization of his own integrity, It is that realization
which we may call the atom's prehension; and Newton first

gave it scientific intelligibility by calling it gravity.
It was, to repeat, the empiricism behind Newton's
physics which turned Edwards toward the firm resolve that
the deepest theological insights are to be achieved through
the empirical method--or the way of experience. And so by

32..
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"Works^ (Dwight ed.), 1, p. 707.
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calling grace.a "new simple idea," he introduced the element of experience into the heart of theological doctrine.
He meant two things by this term: first, that grace is
the mode of man's actual experience of God's presence in
the atom; second, that every atom itself is a kind of
simple idea inasmuch as it prehends God, or represents
God's coming to an awareness of his own infinite integrity
through the finite integrity of the atom. But in both
cases, grace is the same identical reality—it is the
actual medium through which man and nature (in this case
the atom) pass into the full experiential presence of
God• Edwards never insisted on any point more strongly
than the fact that grace is entirely beyond man's nature,
and is a gift of God. We shall see the full si.gnificance
of this in our discussion of transeen dence«

II. A SHIFT IN THEOLOGICAL METAPHOR

The adaptation of Newton to theology was really a
subtle adaptation of scientific language to theological
language. What this means, of course, is a subtle shift
in metaphor. The metaphors which enabled Newtcn to
describe the physical order from a mathematical viewpoint
were adapted to theological use by Edwards. For he never
doubted that the meaning of such concepts as those of
atoms and gravity extended far beyond the realm of sheer
mechanics; and he never doubted about "the folly of seeking
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for a mechanical cause of Gravity "*J~' without taking into
account the reality of a wider organic world in which it
is situated. The language which describes the mechanical
world is the basis for a descriptive language of the organic
world. From the very beginning of his intellectual life he
was dominated by a single insight—that everything in the
universe, physical or otherwise, bears a special relation
to universal consciousness. Now Newtonian physics allowed
a clear understanding of how that relation exists in the
physical order, and how it could be made the foundation of
a metaphysical understanding of the over-al.1 relationship
between God and the world.
Edwards construed this relationship by the metaphor
of life rather than of being simply considered. Traditional
theology was satisfied with an omnipotent God who stands
outside the order of his creation as a separate substance.
It appeared to be bothered not at all by the difficulties,
the tangle of inconsistencies, of a being with absolute power who reigns from a remote and detached position. Such a
God was inconceivable to Edwards, for it violated the principle that consciousness reigns supreme in the world.
Therefore, God had to be recast into the role of "immanent
and efficient will" (to borrow the expression from A. V. G.

34

Alien)"* whose relation to his creation resembles that of a

34

I • Jonathan Edwards, p. 58.
i
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living organism to its various modes of dynamic expression,
Such an interpretation permitted Edwards to establish
the compatibility between the total "otherness" of God and
his immediate presence in the world of man's experience,
for they are two essential dimensions of the one infinite
organism. The transcendent God is the matrix of all
possible and actual experience, and the immanent God is
the very substance of the same experience. Or to put the
same idea on a different footing: to call God a living
being is to entertain the possibility of seeing him as the
totally other (but not totally removed), and' the totally
present (but not enclosed within or circumscribed by the
world)• A living God, St. Bonaventure said long before
Edwards, is "within all, though not included in them;
beyond all, but not excluded from them;:: above all, but
not transported beyond them; below all, and yet not cast
down beneath them."""

It is important to note that when the shift in metaphor franbeing to life occurs in theology, a concomitant
shift from substance to symbol must occur in metaphysics.
While this is not an uncommon insight, among modern
writers Scheler has given it a most cogent expression.
When the world is viewed as a whole, he tells us, as a

35_.

'The Mind's Road to God, trans. George Boas (New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 38.
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"collective organism, permeated by a unitary life;"
it requires an organic mode of approach to
things. Given such a viewpoint, the ideal and
real (teleological or causal) connections between
things, as studied in science and philosophy are
supplemented by a new sort of relationship, coexistensive with what is real in life and its mode
of expression, a specifically symbolic relation,36
Only when we look at our world as a collective organism
does it occur to us that "all natural phenomena appear both
as the undivided total life of a single world-organism
and the universal fluid matrix in which it is expressed."
We come to realize that the perceptible attributes of all
natural phenomena "are only the outward aspect and frontier

37

of the inner life" of the world."'

The relationship described by Scheler is symbolic in
the sense that an organism and its modes of expression are
related internally and not externally, these being its
common parts and unitary life. Things are modes of life
and not isolated particles of inert matter. For that
matter things are not things at an—for this implies mere
juxtaposition to their source, and spatial separation
from it. We replace the notion of "thingness" with symbol,
and conclude that everything is inside its source, not
spatially so much as relationally. Douglas Elwood is perhaps

'Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. P. Heath,
ed. W. Stark (New Haven":Yale University Press, 1954), p. SL

37

Ibid,, p, 82 ff. Scheler cites a statement by Rodin
that "a thing is simply the shape and outline of the "'flame*
which gives it birth."
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alone among all the commentators on Edwards' theology to
emphasize the point that God is neither a first cause^ remote
from the world, nor a substance coextensive with it, but
the life-principle which suffuses all that is:
(Edwards') employment of what Tillich calls
•symbolic use' of substance and causality
enabled him to overcome both naturalistic
pantheism and rationalistic theism. • • •
The being of God interpenetrates the universe,
recreating it in each new moment, yet without
cancelling the relative and dependent individuality of the creature. In terms of experience,
individuality consists in the degree and manner
of our participation^n God, without whom we
would not be at all. a
We have only to note here that the th'eological shift
from a mechanical to an organic view was prepared for and
even implicit in the sense of the heart and the consent
to being. The reading of Newton was the occasion of the
shift, but certainly not the sole cause. The dominance
of experience, especially aesthetic experiencey must have
been the decisive inlfuence. To construe God as the
life-principle of an organic world could not have been the
conclusion to a logical syllogism whose premises were
derived exclusively from Newtonian science* God's mysterious presence in the world can never be penetrated by reason
alone, apart from intuition. William James never passed an

opportunity to illustrate the paucity of logic in dealing
with religious or philosophical matters, and with a world

38_.
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in which life is a primary datum. In The Varieties of
Religious Experience he says:
The old logic of identity never gives us more
than a post-mortem dissection of disjecta membra
• • • the fullness of life can be construed to
thought only by recognizing that every object
which our thought may propose to itself involves
the notion of some other obiect^which seems at
first to negate the first one.
It remains for us to see how Edwards transcended these
limitations of logic with regard to the presence of God*

III. THE LOGIC OF CREATION

James* point is well taken that the fullness of life
does not lend itself to anything but a post-mortem dissection when one chooses to employ logic. And Edwards'
doctrine of creation is clearly a theological case in

point, for he illustrates the impossibility of any logic
to putting God at a distance from the world and to impose
a limitation on his creative will. The first point (of
separation) will be dealt with later. For the present, let
us dwell upon the second: God cannot be controlled or

'The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York:
Colliery 1961), p. 351. In a similar vein, he announces
his abandonment of logic as the measure of experience: "I
have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic,
fairly, squarely, and irrevocably. It has an imperishable
use in human life, but that use is not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality. . . .
Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what
word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds
it." Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans Green 1940) ,
pp. 212-13. ~~
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directed by any constraining logic of creation which is
prior to and above his nature. Whatever logic there is
emerges out of the act itself and is'created along with
everything else. It can only be discerned with a sense
of the heart, i.e,, on the level of experience.
There are two aspects of this matter: (1) creation
is the utter communication of God's goodness; and (2) the
logic of creation is bound up with the simple fact of his
disposition to communicate--and nothing more. What can
be inferred from these statements is that God uses what
might be called an "experimental" logic, and our access
to it is through an analogous experimentalism, or through
openness to experience.
As to the first proposition, Edwards makes the idea
of communication central to his understanding of creation.
This is manifest throughout his writings, in the "Miscellanies" as well as "God's Chief End in Creation." The
texts are quite clear that "the great and universal end of
God's creating the world was to communicate Himself.
God is a communicating being. "-lw The theme is repeated
again in "God's Chief End in Creation."
Thus it appears reasonable to suppose that it
was God's last end, that there might be a glorious
and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness
of good ad extra, or without himself; and that

I
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I The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
s Notebooks, p. 130.
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the disposition to communicate himself, or
diffuse his own Fullness»_was what moved
him to create the world,
Communication constitutes the inner life of God but
it puts no restrictions on his nature to say that he takes
delight in his communication with creatures. It is a
fallacy to impose a dichotomy between God and the object
of his communication, and then to say that the need to
communicate with it limits him. It is fallacious because
there cannot be the severe separation between his communicative nature and the object of communication. Indeed, God's
communication is an act of self-discovery, .and the creature
is the medium through which divine self-communication is
enacted, "God can't be said to be the more happy for the
creature, because He is infinitely happy in Himself. He
is not dependent on the creature for anything, nor has He
received any addition from the creature." But because
the creatures are intrinsically related to God as the medium of his self-communication, "God has the more delight
for the loveliness and happiness of the creature, fiz., as
God would be less happy if He were less good, or if it were
possible for Him to be hindered in exercizing His own
goodness or to be hindered from glorifying Himself."

41Works (Dwight ed.), HI, p. 20.
42-,

-The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
Notebooks, pp. 138-9.
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In his own infinite fullness he has no need of creatures,
yet takes genuine delight in them because they constitute
an aspect of that fullness.
Now to the second proposition, which follows from
the fact that creation is the continuous diffusion of God's
nature. It is expressed in this manner: the logical
structure of creation is to be found in the diffusive
process and not prior to it. The rationale of creation
resides in, and originates with. God's disposition to
diffuse and communicate himself and not in any preexisting hierarchy of Platonic Ideas. Edwards states
his position on this matter of Ideas unequivocally* It
is wrong to assume that God has an inclination "to communicate himself to an object," for this seems to presuppose
"the existence of the object, at least in idea." And it
would be inconsistent with his nature to be bound by an
idea prior to his communication,

The diffusive disposition that excited God
to give creatures existence, was < .• • a com-

municated disposition in general, or a disposition in the fullness of the divinity to flow
out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition
there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse sap and life, is doubtless the reason of
their communication to its buds, leaves and
fruits, after these exist. But a disposition
to Communicate of its life and sap to its fruits,
is not so properly the cause of its producing
those fruits, as its disposition to diffuse its
sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak
strictly and according to truth, we may suppose,
that a disposition in God, as an original property
of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite
fullness, was what excited him to create the
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world; and so, that the emanation itself was
aimed at him as a last end of the creation.
We might say that, if anything. God is governed by a
kind of "experimental logic," in the sense that the whole
rationale of creation manifests itself only as he creates,
or "experiments" with his diffusive nature. The emanations
of God are actually a self-revelation. So intimate is the
bond between his inner nature and his expressive nature, that
the former is revealed to God himself through the latter.
He can only know what his inner life is when it becomes
diffused in space and time. For example, in order to appreciate the fullness of his infinite glory, he must "experiment" with it through emanation and thus discover its finite
expression in the creature:
This propensity in God to diffuse himself,
may be considered as a propensity to himself
diffused; or to his own glory existing in its
emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite
propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is
that which causes him to incline to its being
abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. • . .So God looks on the com-

munication of himself, and the emanation of the
infinite glory and good that are in himself to
belong to the fullness and completeness of
himself; as though he were^ not in his"mg5t
complete and glorious state without it.

43Works (Dwight ed,) , HI, p. 21.
44_

'Works (Worcester ed.), VI, p. 37. (My italics.) In
the "Miscellanies" he writes: "For God to glorify Himself
in His works or to communicate Himself in His works, which
is all one." The__Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his
Private Notebooks, p. 1297
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An important aspect of the divine fullness which is communicated is knowledge. The creature's knowledge of himself
is a participation in divine self-knowledge? it is an
instance of God's self-revelation. "This knowledge (or the
creature) is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge which primarily consists in the knowledge
of himself. . < . This knowledge in the creature 4 •• is
the image of God's own knowledge of himself. It is a parti-

45

cipation of the same." And so it is with happiness and
delight: in the creature they are exemplifications of God's
happiness and delight in himself. "God's .delight in (the
happiness of the creature) is only a delight in His own
brightness, communicated and reflected, and in his own
action of communicating, which is still to be resolved

46

into a delight in Himself.""' The intention of Edwards
in these texts is to assert that God's glory, his knowledge of himself, and his happiness in himself are mediated
through his emanations. Therefore, the rationale of his
creation must reside entirely within his emanative nature;
which is to say that the rationale itself is an emergent
reality.

45Ibid., p. 39.
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The_ Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from His Private
Notebooks, p. 147.
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IV. NATURE AS SACRAMENT

A major consequence of immense practicality follows
from this analysis of God's unrestrained disposition to
diffuse himsel£--a consequence which is crucial to Edwards'
doctrine of Presence, If God is revealed to himself through
the experimental process of emanation, then man can discern
his communicated presence only with a similar experimental
approach--with a complete openness to experience. God
speaks with "a kind of voice or language ... to instruct

47

intelligent beings in things pertaining to Himself,""' and
man must respond by cultivating an open attitude to nature
as the infinite lexicon of God's language. First of all,

multiplicity is in God? it constitutes an aspect of his
nature•

There is a variety in light. One and the same
white light, though it seems to be an exceeding
simple thing, yet contains a very great variety
of kinds of rays, all of so many different excellent and lovely appearance. So the same
simple spirit of God seems to contain a great
variety, and therefore He is in Revelation seven
spirits. There is one body, one spirit, and yet
a vast variety of gifts.48
Therefore, if man would share in the variety of his gifts,
he must open his experience out to their accessibility in
nature. He must, in other words, be accustomed to seeing

47_

Image 57, Images or Shadows of Divine Things, p. 61.

'Image 58, Ibid., p. 63.
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nature as a sa.crament, as a medium through which he can
experience the infinitely various ways that God gives
expression to the rich variety of his nature,
The notion of a sacramental nature cannot

be tossed off lightly, for Edwards allows it full
play in his thought, especially in the cryptic
volume of Images or Shadows of D±yi.^Q_7hinqs» Ever
since their publication by Perry Miller the question
has persisted: What is precisely the meaning of the
words "image" and "shadow"? Are they intended to be
mere tropes used for petty moralizing, or do they
convey a deeper meaning? Does Edwards declare that
the images in nature express some profound truth
about themselves, telling us that they are sacramental conveyances which enable a man to attain to
God's presence? This is the more likely interpretation, and the one we shall pursue here. Professor
Miller's claim that Edwards supplanted the Bible with
nature as the superior source of revelation remains
unsatisfactory for its unbalanced view; that he
ever intended to subordinate Scripture to a direct
perception of God's presence in nature seems rather
far-fetched and certainly inconsistent with the bulk
of his thought and work, and yet such an interpretation
has been put on the Images and on Miller's commendable
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essay •-'"/ However, this is an extreme to the opposite

direction from dismissing the Images as an exercise in
rhetoric. All the evidence indicates that Edwards considered Scripture and nature as distinct but complementary
aspects of the same divine communication, and the two must
be held in equal esteem. Both are fully within the purview
of human experience, and cooperatively assist man in his
quest for the presence of God.
The theme of the "Images" is summed up in the view
that throughout nature there are adumbrations of God.
All events and objects of our ordinary experience bear a
significant relation to God; in their very natures they
constitute the finite embodiment of their infinite
original. They are not merely the occasions of the discovery of some fact about God, nor are they analogous
illustrations of a profound spiritual truth. But they
are the actual presence of that fact and truth. Thus:
Christ often makes use of representations
of spiritual things in the constitution of the
(world) for argument, as thus: the tree is
known by its fruit. These things are not

49^

For a discussion of this point, see the review of
Miller's essay by H. Shelton Smith in American Literature,
XXII (May, 1950), 192-94. "Miller concludes that Edwards
carried his theory to the place where he really subordinated
Scripture to a direct perception of God through natural
images. One may, according to Edwards, listen to God's
spoken word in the Bible, but, better still, one may 'see
Him in Images.' This, says Miller, 'is Edwards' peculiar
and inspired conception.'"
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merely mentioned as illustrations of his
meaning, but as illustrationsc^nd evidences
of the truth of what he says.
The scriptural science of typology, which is the study of
prophetic events in the Old Testament, called types, and
their fulfillment in the events of the New Testament, called
antitypes, is now extended into nature by Edwards, so that
natural events are "typical" of the spiritual, "anti—
typical" world.
The system of created being may be divided
into two parts, the typical world, and the
antitypical world. The inferior and earnal,
i.e«, the more external and transitory part
of the universe, that part of it which is inchoative, imperfect, and subservient, is typical
of the superior, more spiritual, perfect, and
durable part of it which is the end, and as it
were, the substance and consummation of the
other. Thus the material and natural world is
typical of the moral, spir,Lt:ual, and intelligent
world, or the city of God.
What is distinctive about the Images, then, is that it
attempts to see the world from within, for to call natural
objects and events "wonderful resemblances and shadows"
of spiritual realities is no denigration of their Status
as second-hand imitations of spiritual realities. They
are called imitations because "they are wholly being from
the fountain,""" i.e., they bear, in the Platonic sense,
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Images or Shadows, p. 49.

51Works (Dwight ed.), IX, pp. 110-11.
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The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards from his Private
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an intrinsic relation to the communicative nature of God as
his theophanies, equally with Man reflecting God's divine
spirit of creation on earth, But to say this is to say that
the sensible world of objects and events really bears God
from within. It stands as his total Presence, and we must
learn of his transcendence as an aspect of that presence,
What Edwards is suggesting in the Images is an understanding

of nature as the wider (indeed, infinite) reality within
which man finds himself actually standing as in the presence
of God.
The idea that within nature events and' objects stand
for themselves as theophanies, is by no means original with
Edwards. It is a new variation of a traditional theme which
found its highest expression within the medieval Franciscan
movement. St. Francis of Assisi effected a revolution in
Christianity when he extended the non-cosmic personal love
of Christ, as Scheler calls it", so as to encompass all of
nature. Before this, Christianity was more or less encumbered by a notion inherited from the Greeks and the
Romans that man stands in opposition to nature, that he
must struggle to disengage himself from it in the name of
an invisible God v;ho stands as its Lord and Creator. Man
must extricate himself from dependence on nature, it was
thought, in order to fulfill his vocation as the imago del,
He, like God, must stand to nature as a lord to his
dominion•
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But the .feeling that man must dominate nature is
missing fromSt. Francis. In addressing the sun, the moon,
fire and water as his brothers and sisters, he puts these
things on an equal footing with man as having an immediate
and intrinsic relation to God. They are all "varying
forms of the same ultimate energy;; shifting symbols of the
same absolute unity," as he says in his "Chant of the
Sun.""^ Hence, the whole natural world expresses some-

thing about itself, something that cannot be mediated by
discursive reason, but must be interpreted on the deeper
levels of experience. Scheler captures this insight into
St. Francis when he says,
What is really new and unusual in St. Francis's
emotional relationship to nature, is that natural
objects and processes take on an expressive significance of their own, without any parabolic reference to man or to human relationships generally.
• • • A natural object, for St. Francis, is a
symbol, a mark, a sign-post, a significant pointer
to the spirit and person of God;not because it is
interpreted, recognized or inferred to be such
by man, • . . but simply in and because^f its
being objectively there, just as it is.
We are not surprised to find that St. Bonaventure, the leading exponent of Franciscan thought, manifests the same
ability to grasp the god-like life of nature from within,
He also accepts nature at face value as the embodiment

of divinity. This is evident in his famous Hindus Road
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Translated by Henry Adams, Mont-Saint-Michel and
Chartres (London: Constable and Co., Ltd,, 1936), p<3A1
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'The Nature of Sympathy, p. 89.
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to God, in which he uses metaphors such as speculum (mirror)
and vestignim to express the relationship between God and
nature. Nature is seen as a mirror which holds the image of
God, or as a work of art which expresses the personality
of the artist. In either case, all creatures constitute a
necessary medium through which one must pass in order to
arrive at what God is in himself. But Bonaventure hastens
to point out that in addition to being a medium, nature is
also the actual embodiment of that for which it serves as
a medium. "With respect to the mirror of sensible things/'
he tells us, "it happens that God is contemplated not only
through them, as by His traces, but also in them, in so far
as He is in them by essence, potency, and presence."
Again, when considering man as image, he says: "Not only
passing through ourselves but also within ourselves is it
given to us to contemplate the First Principle."
In recapitulating the theme of God's interpenetration of
all creation, Bonaventure writes the puzzling pronouncement
that divinity is an "intelligible sphere whose center is
everywhere and whose circumference (is) nowhere, as one
of the noblest and most exalted flights of human understanding."'"

55The Mind's Road to God, p. 14.
56_.

Ibid., p. 28,

57Ibid., p. 38.
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The same kind of symbolic world that appealed to
Francis and Bonaventure appeals also to Edwards, The substantial reality of all things resides not in their independent, truncated essences, but in their relation to the
transcendent nature of God, Edwards makes this abundantly
clear in the consent to being. To call events and objects
of nature symbols is to assert that what they are in themselves passes infinitely beyond the limitations of space
and time, or any restrictions human reason is capable of
imposing on them. Every event and every object is the
finite embodiment of the infinite .God. In his admirable
study of the nature of religion, Mircea Eliade notes that
symbolism plays a decisive role in the religious life of
many for "it is through symbols that the world becomes
transparent, is able to show the trancendent,"
But the symbol does more than show the transcendent; it is
the actual presence of it. This is what Edwards clearly
saw, and what he wanted to make manifest. The message
of the Images or Shadows is th-at God is present in the

image in all its limitation, in all its fini^ude, and not
in spite of it. This is why the images are illustrations
of truths about themselves, and not about some higher
reality for which they are the mere occasion to draw an
analogy. This is the difference between a type and a trope,

'The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harper and
Row, 1961), p. 130.
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The former, the type, is a real symbol of itself as the
presence of God; the trope is a figure of speech used for
the convenience of human expression< The system of types
presented by Edwards suggests that the infinite God would
not come into his fullness without the infinitude of finite
creatures. Thus,

The emanation or communication of the divine
fullness . . . has relation indeed both to God
and the creature: but it has relation to God
as its fountain, as the thing communicated ijs^
something of his internal fullness. The water
in- the stream is—something of ^fche fo un t ain; an d
the beams of the sun are something of the sun.
And again they have relation to God as their
object: for the knowledge communicated is the
KndwFedge of God; and the love communicated, is
the love of God; and the happiness communicated,
is the joy in God. In the creature's knowing,
esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God,
the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged:
his fullness is received and returned. Here, is
both an emanation and remanatioh~< TlTe refulgence
shines upon and into the creature, and is reflecting back to the luminary. The beams of glory
come from God, are something of God, and are
refunded back again to their original. So that
the whole is of^ God, and in God, and to God; and
he is the beginning, and the middle, and the end.
Every creature represents the presence of God's fullness
because it is a sui generis, an utterly unique and individual
manifestation of that fullness. Since there is nothing else
in the universe like this creature, it is an aspect of God's
infinity. Without it, without its sheer singularity, God
would be less than he actually is.

59Works (Dwight ed.), Ill, p. 84.

169
The idea of calling Edwards a metaphysical symbolist
is by no means a novelty. It had occurred to an early
student of hi.s thought that his "deepest spiritual affinity
was not with Calvin, but with Dante,""w And among a later
generation of writers, A. C. McGiffert was well aware that
Edwards "thought of nature symbolically."WA But what seems
to be lacking in their suggestion is an awareness of how
thorough-going a symbolist he was, A common interpretation
of his doctrine has prevailed which would make it at best a
mystical flirtation with the beauty of nature. In the same
text, McGiffert writes: "The loveliness of nature and its
majesty suggested to his enraptured eye the lovely and
majestic glory of God.nv" But it did more than suggest:
it was^ the beauty and majesty of God. To a symbolist,
nature is an overpowering force and not a gentle persuasion.
So Edwards saw nature as the highest expression of beauty.
We can conceive of nothing more beautiful • • •
than the beauties of nature here, especially the
beauty of the more animated parts of this world.
We never could have conceived of these if we had
not seen them; and now, we can think of nothing
beyond them; and therefore the higher beauties
of art consist in imitation of them.

'H. N. Gardiner, "The Early Idealism of Jonathan Edwards/' Philosophical Review, IX (Nov., 1900), p. 596.
'Jonathan Edwards, p. 30.

62Ibid.
"Miscellanies," No. 296, quoted by Miller, Images or
Shadows of Divine Things, p. 35.
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For the person with a symbolic view of the world, nothing .less than a direct perception of God's presence
will do; man's relationship with him can be nothing short
of immediate experiential contact.
The manifestations God makes of Himself in His
works are the principle manifestations of His perfections, and the declaration and teachings of His
word are to lead to these. By God's declaring and
teaching that He is infinitely powerful and wise,
the creature believes that He is powerful and wise
as He teaches, but in seeing His mighty and wise
works, the effects of His power and wisdom, the
creature not only hears and believes, but sees His
power and wisdom/ and so of His other perfections,64
Man has to orient himself experientially to a symbolic
world—a world in which the ineffable is always presents
In all his contacts with this kind of a world, there is an
aspect of it which always escapes the conceptualizing power
of his mind. And herein does Edwards find the true meaning
of transcendence. The source of experience is always beyond
all actual and possible experience, Yet this source is
nevertheless an integral dimension of every experience.
It is the objective presence of what Edwards calls grace:
the medium through which man becomes capable of experiencing
God's presence in nature. As a medium, grace has an
objectivity to it, an ontological status which he describes
as the Objective Good. But whether we call it the Inherent
or Objective Good, what matters here is that grace comes as
a gift from the sovereign and free God; it is a "fruit of

'"Miscellanies/* No. 777, Ibid., p. 36.

171
the Spirit" totally beyond the boundaries of nature. So
the doctrine of grace is Edwards' last word on the mystery
of transcendence. The transcendent God who is the infinite
ground of all reality, all experience, is fully present in
all his transcendence as the Inherent and Objective Good,
i.e., as the individual's participation in grace and its
full presence. What the truly enlightened man, the gracious man, calls the ineffableness of his experience, that
which surrounds and bathes it, Edwards calls the gracious
presence of God.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

Among the major themes in the development of a
native philosophical tradition in America, experience
has had a position of preeminence. One can say
that the tension between experience and thought/
the "way things are" and "the way they are traditionally conceived to be," has been the source of
much creative energy in our history. To the extent
that traditional .categories of thought openly
clashed with the demands of experience, then to
that extent America has proven that this unstable
situation can, at its bes»t, produce an experimental
frame of mind which is fertile and creative. It
is not surprising to discover that the golden age
of American philosophy asserted the supremacy of
experience over the universal principles of
thought which governed the European mind for
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centuries*~

-This primacy of experience did not originate in
the philosophies of James and Dewey nor with the transcendentalists, but its origins can be traced back to the Puritans
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* The contribution of these early settlers of New England to the tradition of experience has been brought into sharp focus by
a whole generation of students of American thought and
culture beginning with the work of Perry Miller. As the
Puritan mind reached maturity in the genius of Jonathan
Edwards, it is possible to consider him a pioneer and
early exponent of this tradition. The present work has
sought to cast light on the rich sense of experience which

underlies his philosophy, and to see that his systematic
thought is organized around and constructed out of a
primary fidelity to the act of perception*

'John J< McDermott has admirably marshaled the support
of evidence and scholarly authority for the claim that "the
persistent tension between ideas and experience should be
the focal point" of American thought. He states: "The
tensions between beliefs held and experiences generated by
incessantly novel circumstances, often of a physical kind,
is a central theme in the thought of John Winthrop, Jonathan Edwards, Horace Bushnell, Emerson, Whitman, and of
course James and Dewey. • • • For the most part, that tra-

dition of American thought which we now regard as seminal
and even patriarchal, clearly sides with experience over
reflection as the primary resource in formulating beliefs."
"The American Angle of Vision—I," Cross Currents, XV

(Winter, 1965), p. 440.
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There are two general conclusions to be drawn from
our study of Edwards. The first is -that he had developed
an original and novel doctrine of experience* And the
second is that it is possible to show that his system of
philosophy is organized around this doctrine. Or, to put it
in another way, it is a plausible thesis that Edwards'

philosophy is the systematic explication of his doctrine
of experience. We have seen that Edwards' aesthetic
sensibility and his complete attention to the concerns
of religion spawned a mystical temperament and consequently
the need for this systematic exposition* The essential
components of his doctrine of experience were the idea of
excellency, the sense of the heart, and the concept of
grace. We then saw that these components were extended
into the realm of value philosophy and resulted in the
Consent to Being, a doctrine in which values are held to

be objective realities capable of being immediately grasped
in direct perception. We also saw the extension of experience into the theological realm where it lent itself to a
fresh interpretation of the traditional question of God's
presence. For Edwards the Puritan this was the ultimate
value of the doctrine of experience.
The work of further refinement of the extension of
experience into these areas has yet to be done• And yet the
present work hopes to have established the conclusion that
one cannot appreciate the genius of Edwards without seeing
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that an elaborate doctrine of experience and religious
orientation is central to that genius. Such a study as this
one is intended to lend a clearer focus to the contributions
of Puritan New England and specifically Jonathan Edwards,
to the Mainstream of American Thought.
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